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ABSTRACT
Many democratic governments recognize a duty to conserve environmental resources, including wild animals, as a
public trust for current and future citizens. These public trust principles have informed two centuries of U.S.A. Supreme
Court decisions and environmental laws worldwide. Nevertheless numerous populations of large-bodied, mammalian
carnivores (predators) were eradicated in the 20th century. Environmental movements and strict legal protections have
fostered predator recoveries across the U.S.A. and Europe since the 1970s. Now subnational jurisdictions are regaining
management authority from central governments for their predator subpopulations. Will the history of local eradication
repeat or will these jurisdictions adopt public trust thinking and their obligation to broad public interests over narrower
ones?We review the role of public trust principles in the restoration and preservation of controversial species. In so doing
we argue for the essential roles of scientists frommany disciplines concernedwith biological diversity and its conservation.
We look beyond species endangerment to future generations’ interests in sustainability, particularly non-consumptive
uses. Although our conclusions apply to all wild organisms, we focus on predators because of the particular challenges
they pose for government trustees, trust managers, and society. Gray wolves Canis lupus L. deserve particular attention,
because detailed information and abundant policy debates across regions have exposed four important challenges for
preserving predators in the face of interest group hostility. One challenge is uncertainty and varied interpretations about
public trustees’ responsibilities for wildlife, which have created a mosaic of policies across jurisdictions. We explore
how such mosaics have merits and drawbacks for biodiversity. The other three challenges to conserving wildlife as
public trust assets are illuminated by the biology of predators and the interacting behavioural ecologies of humans and
predators. The scientific community has not reached consensus on sustainable levels of human-caused mortality for
many predator populations. This challenge includes both genuine conceptual uncertainty and exploitation of scientific
debate for political gain. Second, human intolerance for predators exposes value conflicts about preferences for some
wildlife over others and balancing majority rule with the protection of minorities in a democracy. We examine how
differences between traditional assumptions and scientific studies of interactions between people and predators impede
evidence-based policy. Even if the prior challenges can be overcome, well-reasoned policy on wild animals faces a
greater challenge than other environmental assets because animals and humans change behaviour in response to
each other in the short term. These coupled, dynamic responses exacerbate clashes between uses that deplete wildlife
and uses that enhance or preserve wildlife. Viewed in this way, environmental assets demand sophisticated, careful
accounting by disinterested trustees who can both understand the multidisciplinary scientific measurements of relative
costs and benefits among competing uses, and justly balance the needs of all beneficiaries including future generations.
Without public trust principles, future trustees will seldom prevail against narrow, powerful, and undemocratic interests.
Without conservation informed by public trust thinking predator populations will face repeated cycles of eradication and
recovery. Our conclusions have implications for the many subfields of the biological sciences that address environmental
trust assets from the atmosphere to aquifers.
* Address for correspondence (Tel: +1-608-890-1450; E-mail: atreves@wisc.edu).
Biological Reviews (2015) 000–000 © 2015 The Authors. Biological Reviews published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Cambridge Philosophical Society.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
2 Adrian Treves and others
Key words: Canis lupus, carnivore, ecosystem services, endangered species, environmental law, lethal management, policy,
sustainability, wolf.
CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. Visions of the public trust meet mosaics of governmental responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
(1) A historical, democratic vision of the public trust doctrine (PTD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
(2) A confusing mosaic of U.S.A. PTDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
(3) Agency capture and public trustees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
(4) An illegitimate view of wildlife trusts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
III. The volatile history of U.S.A. predator policy with a focus on gray wolves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(1) The courts’ perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(2) Predator litigation will recur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
IV. Human-caused mortality in predator populations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
(1) Lack of scientific consensus on sustainable, human-caused mortality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
(2) The nascent science of poaching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
V. Human attitudes to predators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
VI. Balancing competing uses of predators with complex behavioural ecology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
(1) Lethal and non-lethal customary uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
(2) Predators as atypical game species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
VII. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
VIII. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
IX. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
X. Supporting Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental principle of the public trust and our starting
premise is that just, democratic governments must preserve
environmental components as assets held in trust for current
and future generations. The governments of at least 22
countries accept some legal responsibilities for environmental
conservation as some form of trust to benefit their citizens,
although the contours and details vary markedly across
jurisdictions (see Fig. 1; Sand, 2004; Blumm & Guthrie,
2012; Sagarin & Turnipseed, 2012). Public trust principles
have ancient roots in many cultures, although 19th century
courts and 20th century legal scholarship in the U.S.A.
played a seminal role in their modern expressions (Sand,
2004; Blumm & Guthrie, 2012; Hare & Blossey, 2014).
Despite a long history of recognizing a public trust doctrine
(PTD) that includes wildlife as assets (see online Appendix
S1 for glossary of terms and case law history), U.S.A.
federal and state governments allowed, or actively pursued,
the eradication of terrestrial, mammalian, large-bodied,
carnivores (predators hereafter) including grizzly bears Ursus
arctos L., mountain lions Puma concolor L. and gray and red
wolves C. rufus Audubon & Bachman, 1851. Since the 1970s,
several large carnivore species have recolonized portions
of North America and Europe (Mech, 1995; Eberhardt &
Breiwick, 2010; LaRue et al., 2012; Chapron et al., 2014).
The future of predator recoveries depends on whether
governments embrace and fulfil their trust responsibilities
(Bruskotter, Enzler & Treves, 2011, 2012). Even today, the
fates of numerous predator species worldwide depend on
a complex mix of laws and social norms superimposed
on the behavioural ecology of sympatric predators and
people (see Sections IV–VI). Here we examine the persistent
challenges humanity faces in conserving predators. In
parallel, we explore the many obstacles to upholding a public
trust. The one illuminates the other. Thus we translate
legal instruments and multidisciplinary science to connect
biological scientists to policy-makers and legal scholars
concerned with environmental conservation. In Section II,
we interweave varied perspectives on the U.S.A. PTD with
federal and state duties recognized for wildlife conservation,
to illustrate the challenges of centralized and decentralized
authority for environmental trust assets such as predators. In
Section III, we recount the volatile history of U.S.A. policy
on predators with a focus on gray wolves, to place current
predator conservation in historical context and illuminate a
neglected public trust. In Section IV, we examine the lack of
scientific consensus on sustainable mortality within predator
populations and its consequences for efforts to preserve
predators as trust assets. In Section V, we review evidence
about human tolerance and intolerance for predators to
illustrate two competing hypotheses for predator extirpation
and the attendant interventions needed to avoid future
extirpation. In Section VI, we review predator behavioural
biology and the challenges it poses in attempting to balance
consumptive and non-consumptive uses. Finally, in Section
VII we recommend steps to implement public trust principles
for predator conservation by any government. Throughout,
we follow Hare & Blossey (2014) when referring to public
trust thinking or principles generally, and we follow Blumm
Biological Reviews (2015) 000–000 © 2015 The Authors. Biological Reviews published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Cambridge Philosophical Society.
Predators and the public trust 3
& Guthrie (2012) when we refer specifically to a PTD in a
particular jurisdiction. Appendix S1 presents a glossary of
PTD and legal terms.
II. VISIONS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST MEET
MOSAICS OF GOVERNMENTAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
Although public trust thinking has roots dating back
millennia (Sand, 2004), our modern recognition of the
PTD began with a few U.S.A. court cases in the early
19th Century. U.S.A. and state Supreme Courts ruled that
the 1776 American Revolution made the people sovereign
and held the union of states responsible for many, if
not all, environmental assets. These include wildlife. One
landmark U.S.A. Supreme Court case in particular (Illinois
Central Railroad Company, 1892, hereafter Illinois Central)
clearly articulated how the public interest in waters and
lands represented a permanent trust encompassing diverse
environmental resources, which obligated the government
to limit private property rights, commercial uses, and grants
of environmental assets (see online Appendix S1). The PTD
articulated by Illinois Central (1892) is still cited today and
featured prominently in the U.S.A. revival of public trust
thinking in the 1970s. Some claim that other countries have
recently surpassed the U.S.A. in extending and enforcing
public trust principles (Blumm & Guthrie, 2012). Certainly
E.U. case law positions governments as trustees of the public
interest in the environment including wildlife (see online
Appendix S1). The international revival is widely credited
by recent authors (Hare & Blossey, 2014; Wood, 2014a) to
the writings and teachings of Judge Joseph Sax (Sax, 1970,
1971, 1980–1981).
(1) A historical, democratic vision of the public
trust doctrine (PTD)
Reviewing U.S.A. federal and state case law, Sax articulated
a coherent vision of the environmental public trust as an
evolving doctrine that was responsive to changing societal
needs and whose paramount role was to preserve public,
environmental assets for future generations and defend
society from undemocratic allocations of environmental
assets. We define undemocratic allocations as those that
reflect tyranny ofminority ormajority, or are otherwise illegal
or unjust. Sax (1970) urged courts to protect and prioritize
the broadest public interest in environmental resources, even
if diffuse and difficult to measure,
‘ . . . when [ignorance] is joined with the courts’ strong feeling
that diffuse public uses are both poorly represented and, by their nature,
difficult to measure, judicial wariness is inevitably enhanced . . .
And if the relevant facts are unknown and yet legislatures and
administrative agencies show eagerness to go forward, the
courts are only reinforced in their overall suspicion that they
are dealing with governmental responsiveness to pressures
imposed by powerful but excessively narrow interests.’ (emphasis
added, Sax, 1970, pp. 564–565)
For our purposes, ‘diffuse’ uses of wildlife would be
inconspicuous, dispersed in space or time, or affecting
individual wild animals subtly (e.g. wildlife watching,
aesthetics and reverence). Sax’s (1970) formulation and those
of recent writers in his tradition (Horner, 2000; Sand, 2004;
Hare & Blossey, 2014) differ from narrower views of the
PTD that prioritize consumptive uses – especially hunting
(NAM Technical Review, 2010). We detail similarities and
contrasts between the two perspectives in Section III. Several
U.S.A. state and local governments recognize and protect
diffuse uses for wildlife in their constitutions, statutes, and
mission statements (e.g. Michigan Constitution Article IV
Section 52, 1963; Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations §
29.011-1; Alaskan Constitution, Article VIII Section 3).
Several countries have recognized a fundamental, diffuse use
as the right to a healthy environment (Blumm & Guthrie,
2012), e.g. Norway’s 2014 Constitution states, ‘Every person
has a right to an environment that is conducive to health and
to a natural environment whose productivity and diversity
are maintained’ (Norway 2014 Constitution, Article 112).
In the U.S.A., despite widespread recognition of the
legitimacy of diffuse uses, many observers have noted
that U.S.A. citizens’ diffuse uses of wildlife tend to be
under-represented by environmental resource agencies and
often under-studied by wildlife researchers (Gill, 1996;
Rutberg, 2001; Dunkley & Cattet, 2003; Way & Bruskotter,
2011). The pro-hunting values in U.S.A. society associated
with the widespread neglect of diffuse uses are generating a
lively debate today (Clark & Milloy, 2014).
Sax’s (1970, 1980–1981) revival of the call to defend
the broadest public interest and diffuse uses was not simply
aspirational. It had a U.S.A. Supreme Court basis and it had
practical consequences manifested in state courts since 1972.
State courts paved the way for an expansive PTD addressing
a broad array of environmental assets (see online Appendix
S1). New Jersey case law led the way since Arnold (1821)
and Martin (1842). One hundred and fifty years later, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held, ‘The public trust doctrine,
like all common law principles, should not be considered
fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet
changing conditions and needs of the public it was created
to benefit.’ (Borough of Neptune City, 1972, p. 54). Sax
(1980–1981) framed the PTD explicitly as evolutionary not
revolutionary, protecting customary uses but allowing for
change in societal priorities and cultural uses. The California
Supreme Court decision on Mono Lake (National Audubon
Society, 1983) followed that lead but set precedents that
simultaneously clarified, extended, and constrained the PTD
(Blumm & Guthrie, 2012). Probably the most significant
extensionwas not the geographic one that extended thewater
trust beyond navigable waters, but that which extended the
PTD to protect newer, non-traditional uses of the waters.
The limits placed on the PTD by theMono Lake decision are
equally notable. In addition to U.S.A. Constitutional limits
(see online Appendix S1), the California Supreme Court
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set a precedent that allocation of the water in Mono Lake
should reflect customary and newer uses of those waters, but
limited by the paramount public interest in that water. In
ruling, ‘The state has an affirmative duty to take the public
trust into account in the planning and allocation of water
resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible’
(National Audubon Society, 1983, note 14), the California
SupremeCourt obligated the state to protect water if feasible.
Because the definition of feasible, ‘Capable of being done,
accomplished or carried out; possible, practicable’ (Oxford
English Dictionary, 2013), does not consider cost except
at a hypothetical extreme that exceeds that possible for a
State, the feasibility of protecting water presumably is limited
mainly by the technologies, skills, and knowledge of the times.
That put the public interest in water above any economic
concerns (Sax, 1980–1981; Blumm & Guthrie, 2012). It
also seemed to place technical and scientific assessments
of feasibility in a central role for determining the scope of
preservation of waters. The preceding two court cases on the
PTD protected society’s self-determination about acceptable
uses rather than enshrining any particular uses.
Pondering the role of the government trustee led Sax to
consider the sometimes-conflicting, relative roles of the three
branches of U.S.A. government (executive, legislative, and
judicial). Sax (1970) admonished the courts to balance the
legislative and executive branches of U.S.A. government,
which most often allocate benefits,
‘When a claim is made on behalf of diffuse public uses,
courts take the first step in the process by withdrawing the usual
presumption that all relevant issues have been adequately considered
and resolved by routine statutory and administrative processes.
That first step is tantamount to a court’s acceptance of
jurisdiction.’ (emphasis added, Sax, 1970, p. 561)
In his vision, the judiciary checks executive or legislative
allocations of trust assets, such as permitting and privatizing,
by using democratic doctrines and constitutional provisions
that protect minorities and diffuse uses (Sax, 1970,
1980–1981). Later observers noted that the judiciary faces
dynamic tensions with regard to interpreting or rewriting
law (Wood, 2014a). On the one hand, courts may counter
tyranny of the majority to protect minority interests (e.g.
protecting the rights of trappers to pursue their customary
uses of wildlife) no matter how unpopular they may be
(Reiter, Brunson & Schmidt, 1999). On the other hand,
the U.S.A. judiciary should counter the majority only by
interpreting the law, constitution, and regulation, not by
rewriting these expressions of majority rule. An opponent
of judicial activism has characterized court efforts to rewrite
law as fuelling a
‘developing clash in liberal ideology between furthering
individual rights of security and dignity, bound up in
notions of private property protection, and supporting
environmental protection and resource preservation goals,
inevitably dependent on intrusive governmental programs
designed to longer-term collectivist goals’ (Lazarus, 1986,
p. 633).
The tension between judicial activism and passivism
plays out differently under PTD than under more common
administrative law.Undermore common administrative law,
courts defer to administrative agencies whereas courts that
are asked to consider PTD may be more liable to scrutinize
agency decisions without deference. Hence some assert that
the U.S.A. PTD relied unduly ‘on a proenvironmental
judicial bias’ (Lazarus, 1986, p. 692). On the other hand, Sax
(1980–1981) argued the PTD imposed a pro-democratic bias
and he expressed strong views on undemocratic decisions by
administrative agencies,
‘ . . .many – if not most — of the depredations of public
resources are brought about by public authorities who have
received the permission of the state to proceed with their
schemes . . . [courts] can assure that decisions made by
mere administrative bodies are not allowed to impair trust
interests in the absence of explicit, fully considered legislative
judgments.’ (Sax, 1980–1981, pp. 186, 194)
Sax was highly alert to undemocratic allocation and
excessive use by current interest groups, but he did not
write extensively about intergenerational equity, which we
view as fundamental to public trust principles. President
Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919), was particularly eloquent
on this theme,
‘Defenders of the short-sighted men who in their greed
and selfishness will, if permitted, rob our country of half
its charm by their reckless extermination of all useful and
beautiful wild things sometimes seek to champion them by
saying that ‘‘the game belongs to the people.’’ So it does;
and not merely to the people now alive, but to the unborn
people. The ‘‘greatest good for the greatest number’’ applies
to the number within the womb of time, compared to which
those now alive form but an insignificant fraction. Our duty
to the whole, including the unborn generations, bids us to
restrain an unprincipled present-day minority from wasting
the heritage of these unborn generations. The movement
for the conservation of wildlife and the larger movement for
the conservation of all our natural resources are essentially
democratic in spirit, purpose, andmethod.’ (Roosevelt, 1916,
Chapter 10, passage 25)
Few advocates for children have pursued legal claims
for intergenerational equity and the few cases brought to
U.S.A. courts have not succeeded so far (e.g. atmospheric
trust litigation in Wood, 2014a). Nevertheless, many legal
scholars in Sax’s tradition view intergenerational equity as
fundamental to PTD (Sagarin & Turnipseed, 2012; Hare
& Blossey, 2014). The rise of conservation sciences and
sustainability sciences have made it practical to quantify
the ‘insignificant fraction’ of users and in some cases
predict the extermination, referenced by Roosevelt (1916)
above. The need to account completely, transparently
and scientifically for environmental asset preservation and
use leads us to turn back to Sax’s vision because he
envisioned accountability to the broad public interest as
a critical prerequisite for just allocation of environmental
assets,
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‘The courts properly evince reluctance to approve decisions
based upon ignorance . . . One product of such judicial
reluctance is an incentive for decision-making agencies
to begin seeking careful and sophisticated measurements of the
benefits and costs involved in resource allocations. To the extent
that judicial hesitancy cautions the agencies against making
such allocations without better information on the public
record, the courts are deterring ventures into the unknown.’
(emphasis added, Sax, 1970, p. 564–565)
Sax’s warning about ‘ventures into the unknown’ lives
on in mandates to use the ‘best scientific data available’
[Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.A. Congress
(hereafter USC) § 1531] and E.U. laws requiring ‘relevant
and reliable scientific information’ and ‘necessary research
and scientific work’ (Habitats Directive, 1992). Norway’s
2014 amended Constitution Article 112 grants. ‘ . . . citizens
are entitled to information on the state of the natural
environment and on the effects of any encroachment
on nature that is planned or carried out.’ Hawaii’s
Court of Appeals went further and authorized the use of
the precautionary principle to protect trust assets when
conclusive scientific proof of harmful use was absent (Water
Use Permit Applications, 2000; see online Appendix S1).
A 2011 U.S.A. presidential order warned against ventures
into the unknown, requiring regulation to be transparent,
accountable, and based on the best available science (see
online Appendix S1; Obama, 2011).
Thus far we have described four fundamental principles
of any PTD. The first pair of principles is that PTDs
must evolve with changing societal uses of assets while
preserving the principal of the asset for future generations
(Illinois Central, 1892; Borough of Neptune City, 1972;
National Audubon Society, 1983). Also, the allocation of
public trust assets to current users should be accounted
transparently and completely, while also being subject to
judicial review or challenges by beneficiaries to ward against
undemocratic allocations (see online Appendix S1). These
powerful principles appear simple but they set a high standard
for trustees (Sax, 1980–1981; Sand, 2004; Klass, 2006;
Blumm & Guthrie, 2012; Hare & Blossey, 2014).
Later legal scholars have proposed an even higher
standard. Some see public trust principles including a
fiduciary obligation similar to that of a financial or charitable
trust (Scott, 1999; Horner, 2000; Wood, 2014a). Trusts
require prudent management to preserve the principal,
favouring asset growth over expenditure, to allow future
generations to choose their own uses as well as continuous,
scientific, and transparent accounting before allocating
assets to current beneficiaries (Horner, 2000; Hare &
Blossey, 2014; Wood, 2014a). Several U.S.A. state courts
have taken steps in this direction (see online Appendix S1).
The role of scientific evidence in accounting for the trust
assets becomes clearer when one considers a fiduciary
obligation. Therefore much of our review addresses
how biological scientists and conservation scientists from
many disciplines might support fiduciary accounting for
wildlife trusts.
Neither Sax (1970) nor we are making the positivist
claim that scientific evidence will settle debates that are
fundamentally about values (Clark & Milloy, 2014). Rather
Sax (1970) implicitly acknowledged that all the governments
that recognize a PTD have already decided to measure
environmental assets so they can be shared, preserved, and
monitored. Whether measuring, preserving, or allocating
assets is right or wrong is beyond our scope, so we direct the
reader to treatments of balancing private and public interests
(Lazarus, 1986; Lasswell & McDougal, 1992; Wood, 2014a).
In practice, predators and other wildlife have been and will
continue to be allocated for preservation or use, so we are
concerned with scientific evidence about the effectiveness of
trustees and the balance of interventions they select. Using
reason to find balance between competing claims for our
common interests can be assisted greatly by sciences and
allied disciplines such as bioethics and political ecology.
(2) A confusing mosaic of U.S.A. PTDs
Even if visions of the public trust were clear, in practice,
many U.S.A. governmental responsibilities for wildlife are a
confusing mosaic (Fig. 1A). Although many states followed
National Audubon Society (1983) in adjudicating water trust
issues (Scanlan, 2000; Blumm et al., 2014), precedents for
wildlife trusts, especially for terrestrial species, have not
been articulated so clearly (Blumm & Paulsen, 2013; Blumm
et al., 2014). A minimum standard for wildlife conservation
was set by U.S.A. federal court rulings that confirmed the
authority and responsibility of states to ‘preserve’, ‘protect’,
‘manage’, ‘conserve’, and ‘regulate the exploitation’ of wild
animals to avoid impairment of the public interest (see online
Appendix S1). We encompass all these state duties generally
with the term ‘preserve’, to capture the principle of leaving
intact the principal of the trust for the next generation and
avoiding impairment of the trust. Although theU.S.A. federal
wildlife PTD (wildlife trust hereafter) is ambiguous or absent
and only a matter of U.S.A. state law (see online Appendix
S1), the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)
is widely recognized as a powerful instrument to prevent
extinction (Norris, 2004).Recent judicial interpretations have
strengthened the linkages between the PTD and ESA, as we
make explicit in Section III. To begin, the U.S.A. Congress
enacting the ESA found diverse customary uses and benefits
of wildlife for all citizens,
‘ . . . fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological,
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value
to the Nation and its people . . . for the benefit of
all citizens . . .The Secretary shall . . . give priority to
. . . particularly those species that are, or may be, in conflict
with construction or other development projects or other
forms of economic activity;’ (16 USC § 1531, Sec. 2(3)(5) and
4(f)(1)(A)).
The ESA thereby prioritized preservation over any
development or economic activity, generating political vitriol
as no other environmental act in U.S.A. history (Plater, 2004;
The New York Times Editorial Board, 2015). Prioritizing
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(A)
(B)
Fig. 1. (A) Three categories of state public trust doctrine (PTD) in the U.S.A. following Blumm & Paulsen (2013). (B) Historic range
of the gray wolf reproduced from Bruskotter et al. (2013).
preservation above allocations of assets is central to public
trust thinking because of intergenerational equity.
Beyond the ESA, the U.S.A. federal government played
a national, coordinating role in environmental protection
starting in the 1960s when several Congressional Acts
established cooperative federalism, within which the federal
government set the standards and states responded (Plater,
2004; Klass, 2006). The U.S.A. Supreme Court recently
opined that setting state trustees’ responsibilities is a matter
of state law for all three branches (PPLMontana, 2012). This
does not exclude a possible challenge that a state does not
meet someminimum, federal standard of wildlife trusteeship,
but the legal test for terrestrial wildlife has yet to be made
to our knowledge. U.S.A. federal regulation such as the
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ESA led states to enact their own regulatory statutes and
build their own wildlife agencies to meet or exceed federal
standards for wildlife regulation. The results were wildlife
trusts that vary from state to state (Fig. 1A) including states
with none (Blumm et al., 2014). Further complicating the
interstate mosaic are federal and tribal jurisdictions within
states, which may have their own trust obligations and serve
as co-trustees (e.g. Sanders, 2013; Wood, 2014b).
Blumm & Paulsen (2013) reviewed state constitutions,
laws, and regulations for assertions that wildlife is a public
trust asset or state assertions using ‘public trust-like language
to describe management of wild animals’ (Blumm& Paulsen,
2013, Section IV.B). Twenty-two U.S.A. states used the
words ‘trust’ or ‘trustee’, to describe management of wildlife
(Fig. 1A). Another 22 states used other PTD language ‘such as
sovereign ownership of wildlife for ‘‘the benefit of all people’’
or for ‘‘the common good’’, or discussion of the ‘‘sovereign
capacity’’ for regulating wildlife in a manner consistent with
the public interest’ (Fig. 1A). The remaining states either
had less articulated versions of the public trust in wildlife
(Iowa, Delaware, and Nebraska), or did not acknowledge
it at all (Nevada, South Carolina, and Utah) (Blumm &
Paulsen, 2013, Section IV.B). Interpretations of the PTD
also vary within states over time (Horner, 2000; Klass, 2006;
Redmond, 2009; Blumm et al., 2014). Although one can
visualize the mosaic based on legal language (Fig. 1A), in
practice, some states may not uphold those duties recognized
in legal language.
One measure of the strength of a state PTD is whether
citizens can challenge the government’s allocations. As of
2006, only 2 states had the strongest form of PTD in which
constitutional rights to trust assets were established, and
15 others mentioned such rights in statutes but limited
accountability of the trustee (Klass, 2006).
In sum, governmental responsibilities to conserve wildlife
have been subject to variable, state-level, democratic
processes producing a mosaic of wildlife conservation
responsibilities. The U.S.A. wildlife trust is also murky
because of narrow influences on administrative agencies.
(3) Agency capture and public trustees
Asset allocation readily becomes undemocratic when special
interests capture the administrative agencies, or capture
the constitutive process, defined as the rules governing
wildlife agency decision-making (Lasswell & McDougal,
1992; Clark & Milloy, 2014). Prukop & Regan (2005,
p. 375–376, cited on p. 20 in Chapter 9 of Clark &
Milloy, 2014), writing for the U.S. Association of Fish and
Wildlife Agencies noted many problems with the constitutive
process in current U.S.A. wildlife management. Clark &
Milloy (2014) comprehensively examined the constitutive
process in predator policy and science in the western
U.S.A., and concluded, ‘ . . . the decision process needs
to be made more open to everyone, more factual about
the entire context, . . . more focused on achieving common
interests . . .Recurring weaknesses [include] expert biases,
. . . ‘‘benefit leakage’’, intelligence failures and delays, . . .
inappropriate organizational arrangements, insensitivity of
decisionmakers to valid and appropriate criticism . . . ’ (Clark
& Milloy, 2014, p. 21 in Chapter 9). Indeed, the majority
of U.S.A. states assigned trust responsibilities to individuals
selected for experience working within an interest group
or affinity with consumptive users of wildlife (Gill, 1996;
Horner, 2000; Clark & Milloy, 2014; Hare & Blossey,
2014). Agency capture will be facilitated if trustees are
selected for their affinity to narrow interests. The government
trustees responsible for allocation of benefits from wildlife
are vulnerable to individual corruption or agency capture by
financial inducement or political patronage. Scanlan (2000)
described the many forms of trustee abdication associated
with agency capture that led to degradation of trust assets,
‘ . . . the regulators entrusted with the duty to implement the
[water trust] are restricted from acting to the full extent
allowed by the court . . . [by] inability to deny permits, a
perceived dependence on local district attorneys to prosecute
violations, understaffing, and pressure from supervisors and
politicians to . . . degrade trust resources’ (Scanlan, 2000,
p. 139).
Appointing trust managers or trustee agencies with
affinity to special interests clashes with recommendations
for selecting fiduciary or charitable trustees based on inde-
pendence, integrity, expertise with trusts or beneficiaries,
comprehensive knowledge of uses, and accountability to
challenges by beneficiaries (e.g. U.S. UniformCode of Trusts
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Trust%20
Code, accessed September 2014). The general standard of
care holds trustees to ‘manifest the care, skill, prudence
and diligence of an ordinary prudent man engaged in
similar business affairs’ (Bogert & Bogert, 1993, p. 167). An
ordinary and prudent man is determined by an objective
standard (Scott, 1999, p. 143), which favours preservation
of the trust principal over expenditures, so must refrain
from maximizing disbursements of benefits in favour of
optimizing preservation of future benefits (Scott, 1999;
Sagarin & Turnipseed, 2012, p. 145). Besides a duty
prudently to apply that expertise, a trustee also has a duty
to solicit sound advice, and keep good records of the assets
(Scott, 1999, p. 144).
As a result of the disparity between recommendations
about public trustees and current practices in hiring
and appointing wildlife trustees, North American wildlife
agencies are facing criticism from those that do not align
with hunting, trapping, and angling interests (Clark &Milloy,
2014). The same may hold for the E.U., whose Commission
recently endorsed management guidelines from the Large
Carnivore Initiative for Europe (Linnell, Salvatori & Boitani,
2008) as best-management practices despite the guidelines
including an unsubstantiated claim that hunting is permitted
for species listed under Annex IV of the Habitats Directive
(1992) see also Michanek (2012). In the U.S.A., accusations
of agency capture have focused on the North American
Model (NAM) which arose in the 1990s (Geist, Mahoney &
Organ, 2001) as promoting hunting, trapping, and angling
as the purpose of wildlife management. In 2010, a document
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on the NAM, published by four professional societies allied
to governmental fish and wildlife agencies, identified the
‘Democracy of hunting’ as one of seven principles of the
NAM and commensurate with the PTD (NAM Technical
Review, 2010). The principle of Democracy of hunting has
been thoroughly examined by Clark & Milloy (2014) who
concluded, ‘The [principle] that we recommend be changed
is the idea of the ‘‘democracy of hunting.’’ . . . these are
special interests.’ (p. 366–367). Problems of agency capture
are particularly important for predator conservation under
the NAM, because ‘ . . . at various times and places, the
[NAM] has been used to justify extermination of large
carnivores for purposes such as increasing populations of
ungulate game species’ (Clark & Milloy, 2014, p. 294–295,
citing Robinson, 2005; see also Bruskotter et al., 2013).
Raising a special interest credo of ‘Democracy of Hunting’
to a level commensurate with the PTD (NAM Technical
Review, 2010, p. 10 Synopsis) has perpetuated and reinforced
an illegitimate view of the U.S.A. and Canadian wildlife
trusts.
(4) An illegitimate view of wildlife trusts
The writings of Sax (1970) and successive generations,
many of whom were practicing lawyers or law professors
(Horner, 2000; Wood, 2009, 2014a; Blumm & Guthrie,
2012; Hare & Blossey, 2014) have elaborated a legitimate
‘broad public interest view’ of the PTD supported by case
law and other legal instruments. By contrast, the NAM
has been advocated by professionals in fish and wildlife
management (NAM Technical Review, 2010) and espouses
seven principles including the ‘Democracy of hunting’
or ‘Hunting opportunity for all’, depending upon the
specific articulation (NAM Technical Review, 2010). This
‘pro-hunting view’ canonizes regulated public hunting of
wildlife as the purpose of wildlife management, and hunters
as privileged beneficiaries of the trust in wildlife (Geist et al.,
2001; Clark & Milloy, 2014, pp. 366–367). The broad
public interest view and this more recent pro-hunting
view differ on the following three points that bear on
our topic: (i) changes in societal values are comfortably
accommodated in the PTD (broad public interest view)
rather than threatening it (pro-hunting view); (ii) the benefits
of wildlife are shared equitably by all members of current
and future generations regardless of their awareness, uses,
value systems, or fees they have paid (broad public interest
view) versus an asymmetrical share with priority given to
hunting, trapping, and angling (pro-hunting view); and (iii)
wildlife differs from other environmental assets because some
interest groups seek eradication, it responds to people’s
actions and policy interventions and vice versa (this review)
versus wildlife differ because they pose liabilities (pro-hunting
view).
The first point of difference (changing societal values) is
illustrated well by the following,
‘The underpinnings of the PTD and the future relevance
and successful application of the [NAM] may be at risk due
to recent changes in society, government policies, and case law . . .
Several significant threats have been identified that directly or indirectly
erode or challenge the PTD in North America . . . These threats
undermine existing state, provincial, and federal laws, as
well as governmental policies and programs. Moreover, they
inhibit sound conservation practices for fish and wildlife
resources . . . ’ (emphasis added, NAM Technical Review,
2010, p. 10).
Proponents of the pro-hunting view perceive threats to the
entire institutional and legal framework of fish and wildlife
management in North America. The authors name the
perceived threats, ‘ . . . inappropriately claiming ownership
of wildlife as private property; unregulated commercial sale
of live wildlife; prohibitions on access to and use of wildlife; personal
liability issues; and a value system oriented toward animal rights’
(emphasis added, NAM Technical Review, 2010, p. 10).
The synopsis of the pro-hunting view of the PTD quoted
above identifies a value system (the animal rights movement)
and a legally recognized concern (personal liability), and
therefore the organizations espousing both, as existential
threats to democratic institutions and the PTD itself. That
identification is illegitimate. It not only demonizes legally
recognized interests but pits government agencies against
citizens who advocate for such interests and concerns. In
this way, the pro-hunting view of the PTD attempts to turn
government trustees and trust managers against a subset of
legally recognized interests. By contrast, the broad public
interest view of the PTD recognizes all legal interests and
provides a guide to how to balance their claims on public
trust assets (Hare & Blossey, 2014). The changes in society,
policy, and law that the authors mistrust are not a concern
for the legitimate broad public interest view of the PTD
because its underpinnings (state and federal constitutions,
laws, and common law) need no protection from democratic
expressions of social change. If the pro-hunting view were
simply an articulation of a special interest agenda, we would
not devote text to this critique. But it is the statement
of appointed trust managers who should even-handedly
consider all legally recognized interests in wildlife (Scott
1999). If adopted legally, the pro-hunting view of the PTD
and theNAMwould prevent future citizens from recognizing
animal rights or personal liability concerns. Although the
NAM Technical Review (2010) reprinted Roosevelt’s (1916)
quotation as we did in Section II, the authors missed the
significance of his eloquent articulation of intergenerational
equity.
Furthermore, the NAM Technical Review (2010) warns
about ‘prohibitions on access to and use of wildlife’ above,
which at face value are required elements of the PTD
(Illinois Central, 1892; see online Appendix S1). Prohibitions
on access and take are encoded in federal and state laws and
rules (e.g. restrictions on the timing, location, and method
for hunting). The authors specify more clearly what they
mean later, ‘ . . . the public is having an increasingly difficult
time gaining entry to hunt or trap on private property or
reach tracts of public land’ (p. 17, NAM Technical Review,
2010). Vucetich, Bruskotter & Nelson (2015) point out that
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support for wildlife conservation does not depend on hunting
and trapping access. Therefore the NAM Technical Review
(2010) epitomizes agency capture by narrow special interests.
Although some of the pro-hunting authors of the NAM
Technical Review (2010) recently struck a more inclusive
note (Decker et al., 2013; Organ et al., 2014), the later
authors also exposed a further difference relating to the
public interest in preserving wildlife in the face of private
interests. The broad public interest view sees wildlife
damages, whether to private property or public interests, as
inevitable consequences of the public interest in preserving
wildlife assets (Bruskotter et al., 2011, 2012). Damage by
wildlife is therefore similar to preserving rivers as assets that
occasionally flood private property and restoring natural fire
regimes that occasionally burn private property. Nevertheless
all native wildlife, as with all rivers, provides benefits to some
citizens and unpredictable benefits to future generations.
The pro-hunting view sees some wildlife as liabilities,
‘ . . . some species have rebounded from scarcity to become
socially overabundant in particular contexts. While it may not
be possible to have a financial trust with ‘too much money,’
it is possible to have too many individuals of a wildlife trust
species within certain contexts, such as those wherein the
wildlife have extensive negative impacts on ecosystems and
humans. This can result in their status becoming a liability rather
than an asset. Controlling the negative impacts of overabundant
populations . . . ’ (emphasis added, Organ et al., 2014, p. 412).
A liability is a debt, pecuniary obligation, responsibility,
answerable by law or equity (Oxford English Dictionary,
2013). Reframing a public trust asset as a liability is neither
useful nor consistent with the broad public interest view of
the PTD that environmental assets are benefits. Although
democratic societies can self-determine the optimal level of
an environmental asset, the mandate for intergenerational
equity sets priority on preservation over any private interest
that currently holds a wildlife population as ‘socially
overabundant’. The challenge as the above authors correctly
note arises when a democratic society determines that an
environmental asset is harming the public interest because of
its over-abundance. The State of Louisiana struck a balanced
note in American Waste and Pollution Control (1993) (see
online Appendix S1) when the Appeals Court held that
trustees might diminish the principal of a public trust asset
after diligent, fair, careful, transparent measurement of all
costs and benefits to the public interest. We are not aware
of any trust managers that have undertaken such diligent
accounting before reducing predator populations and some
state trustees have clearly not respected such principles (e.g.
see online Appendix S2).
The terms liability and socially overabundant may foster
intolerance, particularly for predators. If left unchecked,
intolerance can lead to impairment of the asset by poaching
and also lethal management (Sections IV and V). The broad
public interest view acknowledges that the public interest in
environmental assets can infringe on other public interests
and on private interests (see Section VI and online Appendix
S1). That is not new to wildlife. Water trust assets frequently
impose costs on riparian landowners (Scanlan, 2000). The
costs are imposed by the public interest in preserving the asset
(navigable waterways) not imposed by the asset itself (water).
Riparian owners are not entitled to block waterways (i.e.
impair the public interest) because they perceive waterways
in a negative light, e.g. as over-abundant. Likewise a private
interest should not destroy wildlife because it perceives a
cost. Sometimes private interests may merit compensation
for wildlife ‘takings’ (Doremus, 1999); wildlife damage has
been adjudicated using takings law (Thompson, 1997).
Nevertheless, the public interests are inalienable so private
rights do not include destruction of the asset, as established in
Illinois Central (1892) (see online Appendix S1). Therefore
liability is not a concept in the PTD, and it has limited
application in wildlife takings case law (Thompson, 1997).
The differences between wildlife and other environmental
assets do not lie in their threats to private interests. Instead
the difference lies in how wild animals and people respond
to each other and how some narrow interests promote
eradication of controversial wildlife.
Wild animals and people typically respond with aversion
(if harmed) and attraction (if helped). Few, if any, other
environmental assets respond to policy or human behaviour,
which changes the compatibility of various uses (Section
VI). The problem with framing wildlife as liabilities is
illustrated by the authors’ leap of logic to advocating
‘controlling negative impacts of overabundant populations’
(Organ et al., 2014, p. 412). In traditional wildlife contexts in
English-speaking countries, control means killing (Boumez,
1989; Allen & Sparkes, 2001; Berger, 2006), especially when
joined to the phrase ‘overabundant populations’. Even if that
phrase was meant to include non-lethal methods, a mindset
of controlling wildlife skips the rational chain of cause and
effect that would lead a trustee to ask if complaints relate
to real or perceived costs, and if real, whether the property
was adequately protected from a public asset, the wildlife. A
mindset that all wildlife are assets held in trust for current
or future generations leads one down a more prudent route
of examining alternatives to depleting the asset. In sum,
the pro-hunting view in 2014 still prioritized lethal uses of
wildlife and remains out of line with public trust thinking
until it disavows its narrow preference for lethal management
and consumptive uses. We conclude the pro-hunting view of
the PTD and its over-arching NAM has failed to guide trust
managers (e.g. wildlife agencies; Smith, 2011) in adopting a
broad public interest view of the PTD.
The vagaries of majority values in particular jurisdictions,
legislative processes, case laws, and administrative agency
rules create legitimate mosaics of wildlife trusts. Murkiness
arises from narrow interests capturing governmental
allocations and even the trust managers. These mosaics
and murkiness are not unique to the U.S.A. (see fig. 1
in Sagarin & Turnipseed, 2012). E.U. Member States
are trustees of European environmental protections and
their interpretations of that trust responsibility may vary
(Lo´pez-Bao et al., 2015; see online Appendix S1). Member
States’ interpretations of their own trustee responsibilities
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toward predators protected by E.U. law are being
adjudicated as we write (Epstein, 2013; Epstein & Darpo¨,
2013; Chapron, 2014). The full contours of wildlife trusts
are rarely clear within a country and neighbouring countries
often have very different obligations for wildlife (Blumm
& Guthrie, 2012). Geographically variable interpretations
and enforcements of the PTD may have advantages and
disadvantages for wildlife populations. Mosaics varying in
environmental protection can potentially provide refuges for
imperilled species, or act as sinks, if one jurisdiction’s policies
are more or less protective than those of its neighbours. Thus
trustee failure may not be irrevocable for a subpopulation of
wildlife. A drawback may be that a mosaic of interpretations
can hamper collective action if different jurisdictions cannot
align policies or transboundary activities Historically many
predator subpopulations were driven extinct in many regions
but persisted in a few. They have only recently begun to
recolonize. That volatile history of predator conservation
and the legal and policy instruments that now exist are well
illuminated by the case of the gray wolf.
III. THE VOLATILE HISTORY OF U.S.A.
PREDATOR POLICY WITH A FOCUS ON GRAY
WOLVES
Despite explicit trust obligations for wildlife articulated by the
U.S.A. Supreme Court in Geer (1896) and other cases (see
online Appendix S1), both state governments and the federal
government continued to enact policies that jeopardized
entire populations of various species during the past century
(Wilcove et al., 1998; Estes et al., 2011). Globally, extirpations
of predators resulted from the destruction and modification
of habitat, direct competition with people over space and
resources, commercial extraction, culturally perpetuated
antagonisms, or political scape-goating, all of which might
have been abetted by governmental neglect (Knight, 2000;
Pereira, Navarro & Martins, 2012; Chapron & Lopez-Bao,
2014; Ripple et al., 2014; Treves & Bruskotter, 2014).
Numerous populations of predators including felids, ursids,
and canids were extirpated across the U.S.A. and Europe
in the mid-20th century (Woodroffe, 2000; Chapron et al.,
2014). For example, two U.S.A. federal agencies eradicated
gray wolves in National Parks and National Forests (Bangs &
Fritts, 1996; Smith, Peterson & Houston, 2003), and many
states used bounties to eradicate cougars or wolves (Thiel,
1993; Riley, Nesslage & Maurer, 2004). Indeed, bounties on
coyotes are still in use (Bartel & Brunson, 2003).
Nevertheless, predator recoveries began in the 1970s in the
U.S.A. and the 1980s in Europe. Two legal instruments are
largely creditedwith these recoveries; theU.S.A. ESAof 1973
(Plater, 2004) and the international Bern Convention of 1979
followed by the Habitats Directive of the European Union
(Epstein, 2013), which protect most large carnivore popu-
lations (Habitats Directive, 1992, Annexes II, IV, and V).
The Habitats Directive (1992) requires that Member States
contribute to reach and maintain a favourable conservation
status for all listed species, and in particular constrains gov-
ernments frompermitting local disturbance or disappearance
of species listed in Annexes II and IV (European Com-
mission, 2006; Michanek, 2012; Epstein & Darpo¨, 2013).
Similarly, the ESA prohibits the ‘take’ (e.g. killing, harm,
capture, pursuit) of listed species, which includes transform-
ing habitat determined to be ‘critical’, thus providing at least
temporary federal authority over state wildlife species listed
under the law (Freyfogle & Goble, 2009). Many populations
of predators (e.g. gray wolves, grizzlies in the conterminous
U.S.A. states) were listed shortly after the ESA’s passage, and
40 years later, several U.S.A. states and local jurisdictions
are preparing for, or have recently regained, management
authority (delisting) for their predator subpopulations. The
process of listing and delisting has not been smooth.
When determining the listing status of a species, theU.S.A.
Fish andWildlife Service (USFWS) must examine five ‘threat
factors’ defined by the ESA (16 USC § 1533(a)(1)). A species
can be removed from ESA protection (or ‘delisted’) when the
threats that led a species to be listed are sufficiently mitigated
that the species no longer meets the definition of either
a ‘threatened’ or ‘endangered’ species (Vucetich, Nelson
& Phillips, 2006). Yet delisting is not the end of USFWS
authority under the ESA. The ESA requires the USFWS to
monitor a delisted species for a minimum of 5 years (16 USC
§ 1531 Sec. 4(g); USFWS, 2006). Among U.S.A. predators
listed under the ESA, only subpopulations of the gray wolf
have been delisted due to recovery, although these actions
have been controversial and federal courts recently reversed
two such determinations. At least seven federal court cases
involved wolves in the last 12 years (http://ecos.fws.gov/
tess_public/pub/delistingReport.jsp). To understand the
implications for predator conservation under the U.S.A.
PTD, we examine the history of wolf policy in greater detail.
Wolves in the conterminous 48 states declined to a
few hundred animals in a small portion of northeastern
Minnesota and on tiny Isle Royale, Michigan by the
1960s (Mech, 1995). Non-conterminous Alaska retained a
population estimated in the thousands across a wide area,
but controversies over wolf policy surfaced there as well
(Fitzgerald, 2009). The USFWS took authority for all non-
Alaskan gray wolves in 1978 and soon after for the Mexican
subspecies C. l. baileyi and the red wolf C. rufus, and began
work on plans to recover all three predators. Recovery efforts
took different approaches in different regions of the U.S.A.
Gray wolves were reintroduced to Yellowstone National
Park and parts of central Idaho during the mid-1990s, and
considered for reintroduction elsewhere (Bangs & Fritts,
1996). In the western Great Lakes states, wolf recovery
efforts involved protecting naturally recolonizing wolf
populations from excessive mortality (Wydeven, Van Deelen
& Heske, 2009a). Efforts to recover the Mexican gray wolf
and the red wolf also involved reintroductions; however, in
both of these cases, the source animals for reintroductions
were captive-bred for release (Bangs & Fritts, 1996; Parsons,
1998). Those efforts testify to the desperate straits of some
predators and to the force of the enabling statute.
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By 2009, gray wolf subpopulations totalled several thou-
sand animals in five states with tendrils beginning to extend
and establish into states adjacent to recovery areas (Fig. 1B).
Between 2005 and 2013, the USFWS proposed delisting two
noncontiguous, regional populations of gray wolves and then
the whole species (http://www.fws.gov/midwest/wolf/).
Several commentators voiced the opinion that recovery
was complete, based primarily on wolf population size
(Wydeven, Van Deelen & Heske, 2009b; Mech, 2013),
whereas other scientists disagreed in part or entirely; cit-
ing, for example, lack of geographic representation across
the species’ historic range and assertions that USFWS failed
to use the best available science (Carroll et al., 2010; Bruskot-
ter et al., 2013; Bergstrom, 2014; NCEAS, 2014). Citing
these and other issues, federal courts have consistently ruled
that alleged recovery of wolves was insufficient to satisfy
the ESA requirements. A series of federal court decisions
between 2005 and 2014 restored federal protections for
wolves (http://www.fws.gov/home/wolfrecovery/). Federal
courts did not agree with USFWS determinations that gray
wolves had recovered sufficiently to delist; or in narrower
challenges, did not agree that the USFWS could issue per-
mits for states to kill wolves in hopes of preventing livestock
attacks (Refsnider, 2009). In 2011, a Congressional budget
rider side-stepped ESA protections and an ongoing federal
lawsuit about gray wolves in the Northern Rocky Mountains
(Treves & Bruskotter, 2011). A Congressional budget rider
had previously been used to side-step ESA protections and
permit timber sales in the habitat of the spotted owl (Strix
occidentalis De Vesey 1860) (Plater, 2004). Because of years of
political conflict over wolves and USFWS’ inability to win
in federal court, Treves & Bruskotter (2011) proposed three
compromise scenarios that reduced legal take of wolves for
at least 5 years, while balancing competing public interests
and the resulting power struggle between states and federal
governments. One scenario proposed down-listing wolves
to ‘threatened’ status under the ESA, which allows more
flexibility in state-initiated removal of wolves (16 USC §
1531 Sec. 4d permits) while preventing controversial pub-
lic hunting seasons. Two years later, the USFWS proposed
removing federal protections nationwide (USFWS, 2013)
and then lost two more lawsuits addressing regional subpop-
ulations (Defenders of Wildlife, 2014; Humane Society of the
U.S. (HSUS), 2014).
(1) The courts’ perspectives
The two most recent U.S.A. federal court decisions compre-
hensively analysed the USFWS’ delisting determinations for
gray wolves in Wyoming and for the Western Great Lakes
(WGL) region, respectively (Defenders of Wildlife, 2014;
HSUS, 2014). In so doing, federal judges clarified important
passages in the ESA and instructed the USFWS on future
determinations. Their clarifications and instructions echoed
principles of the public trust albeit implicitly. The echoes will
reverberate for many other predators, if not other wildlife.
In the Wyoming case, the court held that, ‘Wyoming’s
statutory and regulatory regime is legally inadequate under
the ESA . . . ’ (Defenders of Wildlife, 2014, p. 206) because
Wyoming’s plan lacked protections for wolves throughout
the vast majority of the state. Throughout state lands, wolves
could be killed for any purpose. The plan also classified
wolves as a game animal in areas adjacent to Yellowstone
and Grand Teton National Parks. In the court’s view,
this policy threatened the capacity of Wyoming to meet
minimum federal recovery goals (100 wolves in 10 packs).
From the standpoint of public trust thinking, the Wyoming
plan allowed the state to deplete the trust asset on state lands,
impede recolonization from the federal source lands, and
potentially diminish the sources by attracting wolves into
hunting zones (sensu Loveridge et al., 2007). It also contained
an unenforceable promise to stop depleting. The judge spent
10 pages clarifying the significance of the ESA mandate that
delisting proceed only if the USFWS finds, ‘adequacy of
existing regulatory mechanisms’ (16 USC. § 1533(a)(1)(D)).
The court held that ‘[USFWS] cannot rely solely on an
unenforceable promise as a basis to delist a species . . . ’
(Defenders of Wildlife, 2014, p. 208), and agreed with a prior
federal court that,
‘Absent some method of enforcing compliance, protection
of a species can never be assured. Voluntary actions, like
those planned in the future, are necessarily speculative . . .
Therefore, voluntary or future conservation efforts by a state
should be given no weight in the listing decision.’ (Oregon
Natural Resources Council, 1998, p. 1155)
The court’s decision evoked three elements of Sax’s
(1970) vision. He called for judicial scrutiny of decisions
to allocate trust assets. The first element was the federal
one restoring authority for wolves to a government that
had helped to extirpate them. The second was Wyoming’s
allocation to any person wishing to kill a wolf on State
lands. The third element was the lack of sophisticated
and transparent accounting within Wyoming’s’ proposed
regulatory mechanisms accepted by USFWS. A few months
later, another federal court ruling evoked public trust
principles for wolves.
On 19 December 2014, a federal court overturned the
USFWS’ decision to delist wolves in the WGL (HSUS,
2014). The judge issued a detailed, 111-page decision that
examined the Congressional record and the language of the
ESA, prior USFWS policy, and prior court precedents. The
court reminded the USFWS that delisting determinations
must consider all of the range of the listed species and
could not delist a species that remained threatened or
endangered throughout ‘all or a significant portion of its
range’ (HSUS, 2014, p. 78). The court required – as had a
prior federal court – the USFWS to explain why territory
that was part of a species’ historical range but no longer
occupied by that species, fell outside a significant portion of
the species’ range (Fig. 1B). The USFWS instead focused
on the species’ conservation status within its current range
(HSUS, 2014). That court also criticized the USFWS for
approving inadequate regulatory protections for wolves,
singling out Minnesota. Nor had Wisconsin and Michigan
escaped scientific criticisms of their regulatory mechanisms
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(Vucetich et al., 2013; Treves et al., 2014; see online Appendix
S2). The judge ruled that the USFWS failed to explain why
mortality factors did not combine or interact to create a
clear threat to the species (HSUS, 2014). These concerns
echo Sax’s (1970) admonition to agencies on clear and
sophisticated measurements of costs and benefits as well as
the public trust principle that citizens of all states are trust
beneficiaries. Clearly federal judges did not agree with the
federal administrative agency making determinations about
endangered species but were larger issues at stake?
The debate over wolves has raised serious questions about
U.S.A. federal wildlife trust obligations. For one, the court
rulings suggest state management of wildlife is subject to
federal court review, despite wildlife trusts lodging initially
in the states (see online Appendix S1). Furthermore, the
historic range of wildlife was scrutinized by the court in
HSUS (2014), which evokes the trust duties of governments
far beyond current range. In 2015, 8 states contained wolves,
leaving approximately 29 that once hosted wolves (Fig. 1B).
U.S.A. citizens living outside the wolf range in 2015 had
little or no opportunity to benefit from the asset not only
because of the need to travel to a range state but also because
lethal management appears to make wolves shy of people
(Section VI). The number of states in which wolves might
recolonize is partly a value judgment for society, and partly
depends on the uncontrollable movements of wild wolves.
But the ESA phrase ‘a significant portion of range’ would
seem to be more than the current range of∼22% of all states
in the historic range (Fig. 1B). Moreover citizens of historic
range now depleted of wolves might ask whether their state
abrogated its duty under the wildlife trust. Given the U.S.A.
wildlife trust is a benefit for current and future citizens
can citizens of one state challenge another state’s wildlife
management? Can citizens challenge their own state’s failure
to promote recovery of native wildlife? Tests of these and
other unanswered questions may be forthcoming if wolves
continue to be managed without public trust thinking.
(2) Predator litigation will recur
The U.S.A. court rulings affirmed the importance of
sophisticated, careful measurements of costs and benefits (e.g.
mortality, range expansion, regulatory mechanisms) before
allocating a public trust asset. Scientists and their advocates
have been scrutinizing agency decisions, particularly for the
ESA with its mandate for use of the best available science.
Both courts emphasized the affirmative duty of enforceable
protection measures and adequate regulations for delisted
species. The decisions also confirmed the rights of citizens to
challenge the trustees. Each effort by USFWS to relax wolf
protections met legal resistance under the civil suit provision
(16 USC § 1531 Sec. 11(g)), which allows any citizen to
challenge the federal government’s actions or inactions under
the ESA. By 19 December 2014, the USFWS had won none
of the civil suits on wolves. Federal court setbacks to the
USFWS do not mean ESA protections will persist forever.
The U.S.A. Congress in 2015 has again drafted bills to delist
wolves by decree including immunity from judicial review as
in 2011 (Treves & Bruskotter, 2011; The New York Times
Editorial Board, 2015). More court challenges relating to
predators should be expected.
We expect more legal challenges for several reasons.
The first reason is that lethal management interests have
captured many agencies and otherwise dominate the process
for decision-making about wildlife in the U.S.A. (Section
II; Clark & Milloy, 2014). Lacking a strong voice in the
policy-making process ‘pro-predator’ interests turn to the
courts. Also, the ‘pro-wolf’ plaintiffs’ successes described
above may inspire further efforts because numerous national
interest groups have expressed concern over the sustainability
of state policies onwolves and other predators (Grandy, 2008;
Male & Li, 2010). State courts will also probably see wolf
litigation. Minnesota and Wisconsin courts already ruled
against plaintiffs in two pro-wolf lawsuits pertaining to public
wolf-hunting seasons (Center for Biological Diversity, 2013;
Wisconsin Federated Humane Societies, 2013). Both of these
lawsuits addressed wolf hunting regulations. Neither invoked
the PTD forcefully. That omission may reflect the uncertain
contours of state trust responsibilities for wildlife (Section II).
If U.S.A. nationwide wolf delisting proceeds, at least 29
additional states would be affected because they contained
the historic range of wolves (Fig. 1B). Of 22 states that
use the words ‘trust’ or ‘trustee’ to describe management
of wildlife (Blumm & Paulsen, 2013, Section IV.B), 5 host
breeding wolves: Alaska, Michigan, Oregon, Washington,
and Wyoming. Another 22 states use other PTD language
(Blumm & Paulsen, 2013, Section IV.B) and 4 of those
host breeding wolves: Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, and
Wisconsin (Fig. 1A, B). If plaintiffs choose to file suits against
states that eradicated their wolves to compel them to restore
wolves, another 14 statesmight see lawsuits (Fig. 1A, B). Some
states with few or no breeding wolves have already accepted
responsibilities to preserve wolves. For example, the states of
Illinois, Oregon, Washington, and California listed wolves
recently. Predator litigationmight echo Sax’s (1970) concerns
about ‘ventures into the unknown’ and challenge state plans
for lethal management, because there is currently little
scientific consensus about sustainable mortality of predators.
IV. HUMAN-CAUSEDMORTALITY IN
PREDATOR POPULATIONS
Effective trustees must impose regulatory authority to
prevent over-use of wild animals. Identifying unsustainable
use or threats to populations is a traditional area
of interest in conservation and wildlife management.
Lately attention has focused keenly on human-caused
mortality in predator populations. That interest reflects
appreciation that human-caused mortality provoked or
significantly contributed to past predator extinctions or
species extinctions including the Falklands wolf (Dusicyon
australis Kerr, 1792), sea mink (Neovison macrodon Prentis,
1903), giant fossa (Cryptoprocta spelea Grandidier, 1902), and
Tasmanian thylacine (Thylacinus cynocephalus Harris, 1808)
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among other national subpopulations eradicated (IUCN
Red List http://www.iucnredlist.org accessed 31 August
2015). Determining sustainable levels of human-caused
mortality demands that managers understand the effects of
vehicle collisions, poaching, legal take (government culling or
permitted hunting), etc., together with variability in birth and
mortality factors that affect census and effective (breeding)
population size.
Models of sustainable mortality for several predator
populations suggest totalmortality rates higher than 15–30%
would be unsustainable (Adams et al., 2008; Chapron
et al., 2008; Vucetich, 2012). The models seem supported
by empirical estimates showing that various population
recoveries have been slowed or reversed by mortality rates of
19–37% or human-caused mortality of 14–32% (Woodroffe
& Frank, 2005; Goodrich et al., 2008; Creel & Rotella, 2010;
Smith et al., 2010; Liberg et al., 2012; Vucetich, 2012; Artelle
et al., 2013). Therefore the addition of a few percentage
points of human-cause mortality can drive a predator
population decline. Prudent governments following public
trust principles should avoid additional uses that deplete the
principal of the trust asset, as we noted in Section II.
(1) Lack of scientific consensus on sustainable,
human-caused mortality
Setting sustainable quotas for hunting or fishing is fundamen-
tal to regulating exploitation. Yet a recent commentary on
scientific understanding of population dynamics concluded
that the field remains under-developed because non-linear
dynamics, time-lags, and regime shifts are poorly understood
(Oro, 2013). In part, typical management tactics, such as set-
ting future quotas by past reported take (Logan & Sweanor,
2001) may augment the volatility of wildlife populations and
lead to crashes (Fryxell et al., 2010; Bischof et al., 2012; Artelle
et al., 2013). Furthermore, predator populations are even less
well understood than most hunted species (e.g. waterfowl
or ungulates). Predators experience local mortality sinks and
super-additive mortality due to breeding failure, infanticide,
or social group dissolution (Swenson et al., 1997; Loveridge
et al., 2007; Brainerd et al., 2008; Andreasen et al., 2012;
Doak & Cutler, 2014). Sinks and super-additive mortality
may deplete broader regions than the sites affected by
predator-killing. As a result the science behind sustainable
use of predators remains contentious and unsettled, even for
gray wolves, one of the best-studied predators globally.
Recently concerns about jeopardizing two U.S.A. wolf
populations arose because six states moved to reduce
their wolf populations substantially by regulated hunting
and other legal killing (Bergstrom et al., 2009; Bruskotter
et al., 2013; Treves et al., 2014). All but one of the states
managed populations of <1000 animals and several states
implemented relatively large quotas (20–34%) by global
standards (Creel & Rotella, 2010). The latter authors
triggered a scientific debate about sustainable mortality
that remains unresolved. Examining the same population of
wolves, three teams of scientists investigated the relationship
between the observed rates of human-caused mortality
and growth of wolf populations in the Northern Rocky
Mountains (NRM) from 1999 to 2009 (Creel & Rotella,
2010; Gude et al., 2012; Vucetich, 2012). In a federal review
of one NRM state’s wolf management plan, Vucetich (2012)
evaluated and replicated the other two teams’ analyses after
correspondence with each. He found a 26% disparity in their
estimates of sustainable levels of human-caused mortality
and inconsistency of methods. Estimating human-caused
mortality rates that a wolf population might sustain without
declining, Creel & Rotella (2010) estimated <22%, whereas
Gude et al. (2012) estimated <48%. The former was
consistent with three prior reviews and estimates of 14–30%
for a wider set of North American wolf populations (Fuller,
Mech & Cochrane, 2003; Vucetich, 2012). Vucetich (2012)
found that both teams’ notations and calculations were
different, non-standard, and did not account for error in the
measurement of human-caused mortality. Vucetich (2012)
predicted that isolated NRM wolves were more vulnerable
than other populations surrounded by contiguous source
populations, suggesting that prudent wolf-managers should
aim for the lower values in the range of mortalities. He also
found evidence to support a prior observation of accelerating
declines inwolf populations (Adams et al., 2008). For 37North
American wolf populations, declines were best described by a
downward sloping curve (depensatorymortality); that implies
accelerating declines for each increment in human-caused
mortality, a pattern not well explained by current theory
(Vucetich, 2012). The major component of human-caused
mortality in many carnivore populations is poaching, which
is also not well understood yet.
(2) The nascent science of poaching
Poaching (illegal killing or capture of wildlife) is a major
source of human-caused mortality in predator populations.
Estimates of poaching as a percentage of all mortalities (rel-
ative risk) ranged from 24–75% across regions and predator
species (Fuller et al., 2003; Andren et al., 2006; Chapron et al.,
2008). As a percentage of predator populations (hazard),
poaching accounted for 6% of NRMwolves in and around a
vast protected area (Smith et al., 2010); 15% in Scandinavia’s
mixed-use landscape (Liberg et al., 2012); 34% of Amur
tigers Panthera tigris L. in four high-poaching years across a
mixed-use landscape (Goodrich et al., 2008); and 11–30% of
wolverines Gulo gulo L. in mixed-use northern Scandinavia
(Persson, Ericsson & Segerstrom, 2009). Therefore, poaching
represents a major mortality factor for predators, which
is often underestimated (Gavin, Solomon & Blank, 2010;
Liberg et al., 2012) (see online Appendix S2). Poaching is
difficult to quantify accurately because poachers have strong
incentives to conceal evidence. In the best scientific study
available, two thirds of poaching of Scandinavian wolves
remained undetected by direct observation (Liberg et al.,
2012).
Counterintuitively, a commonly proposed remedy for
poaching is to legalize killing via regulated hunting or
government-regulated culling (Mincher, 2002; Refsnider,
2009), despite the scientific uncertainties described above. At
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present, the only systematic study of the relationship between
poaching rate and hunting rate showed no relationship
among four subpopulations of European lynx (Lynx lynx
L.; Andren et al., 2006); the subpopulation with the highest
hunting rate had the second highest poaching rate and
the lowest hunting rate had the highest poaching rate. A
meta-analysis of many more populations would be useful to
help resolve this issue.
Under these conditions, prudent government trustees
managing populations of predators that face high poaching
should prioritize understanding and preventing poaching.
Because illegal uses detract directly from all other legal
uses, anti-poaching interventions seem high priority for
every prudent predator trust manager. Public trust thinking
suggests illegal uses should be counted directly against any
other uses that deplete the resource. But the difficulty of
accounting for illegal uses may lead trustees to turn a blind
eye to illegal killing.
Hopeful fixes for poaching have been proposed, such
as increasing government-sponsored culling or regulated
harvest, Indeed, the USFWS asserted in federal court that
permitting states to kill wolves perceived as problems would
reduce poaching (Refsnider, 2009). That prediction was
examined for wolf-culling in Wisconsin (Olson et al., 2014).
Although the authors concluded that more culling led
to less poaching, their analysis did not account properly
for within-year and between-year time series that affect
observed poaching and culling patterns. Other scientists have
proposed a more subtle benefit of legalizing predator-killing.
Legalizing predator-killing might raise tolerance and inhibit
poaching among those that benefit from predator-hunting
(Ericsson & Heberlein, 2003; Heberlein, 2008; Refsnider,
2009). In 2007, when the USFWS proposed removing
federal protections for grizzly bears, the agency claimed that
hunting promoted ‘ . . . tolerance for grizzly bear recovery’
(USFWS, 2007, p. 14784), but acknowledged that, ‘there is
no scientific literature documenting that delisting would
or could build . . . tolerance for grizzly bears’ (USFWS,
2007, p. 14902). Some evidence suggests that approval
for poaching or intentions to poach increase when other
forms of predator-killing are legalized (Treves & Bruskotter,
2014). Therefore public trust thinking would demand a
clear understanding of poaching, intolerance, and proposed
interventions for either.
V. HUMAN ATTITUDES TO PREDATORS
A prudent trustee will want to understand how the
beneficiaries perceive the asset lest they use it illegally or
disdain the benefits. When the beneficiaries are legion, such
understanding demands the most sophisticated and clear
methods from social science. Decades of research since the
1970s show that majorities of residents within and without
predator range care about predators and how they are
managed (Kellert, 1985; Williams, Ericsson & Heberlein,
2002; Dressel, Sandstro¨m & Ericsson, 2014). The prevailing
view of attitudes to predators is that society today accepts
predators more than in most of the 20th century, and in
part, changing attitudes allowed predator recolonization
(e.g. Schanning, 2009). In this view, the environmental
decades of the 1960s and 1970s in the U.S.A. and Europe
reflected a sea change in individual attitudes to predators
across broad regions and many sectors of society. The
claim is reasonable and straightforward but discounts the
pervasive, positive icons associated with predators in western
and non-western cultures (Knight, 2000; David, 2009). The
nearly complete lack of quantitative data on attitudes of
the average citizen before 1970 has hampered scientific
examination of the prevailing view (Kellert, 1985; Schanning,
2009). One alternative hypothesis is that powerful but narrow
interest groups have long pushed for predator eradication,
independent of individual attitudes in the broader public.
Because legislation can both lead and follow public opinion,
it seems plausible that the power elites that shaped predator
policy in the past have changed recently and may do so
again. To elucidate these competing hypotheses, we review
research on attitudes to predators.
Most research on attitudes to predators has been
conducted on gray wolves. An early meta-analysis of 37 data
sets spanning 1972–2000 showed attitudes towards wolves
correlated negatively with age, rural residence, and agri-
cultural occupation; and positively with education, income,
and living outside wolf range (Williams et al., 2002; see for
Europemore recently, Dressel et al., 2014). People active near
wolves expressed more negative attitudes than those more
insulated by distance, livelihoods, or pro-wolf world-views
(Naughton-Treves, Grossberg & Treves, 2003; Karlsson &
Sjo¨stro¨m, 2007; Heberlein & Ericsson, 2008; Shelley, Treves
& Naughton-Treves, 2011). Recent reviews confirmed that
attitudes towolves weremore positive outsidewolf range than
inside it, both in the U.S.A. and in Europe (Bruskotter et al.,
2013; Dressel et al., 2014). Furthermore, negative attitudes
tended to increase with time within wolf range (Majic & Bath,
2010; Treves, Naughton-Treves & Shelley, 2013; Dressel
et al., 2014), although the causes of change are not clear
because individual experience did not seem to predict lon-
gitudinal change in individual attitudes (Treves et al., 2013).
Negative messages – media emphasizing negative aspects
of wolf recovery (Houston, Bruskotter & Fan, 2010) and
political rhetoric (Bruskotter, 2013; Bruskotter et al., 2013),
largely unleavened by positive messaging – might have
reduced tolerance for wolves among sympatric residents of
wolf range (Treves & Bruskotter, 2014). Expansion of lethal
management may also have diminished the perceived value
of wolves (Treves et al., 2013). Inaugural implementation of
one season of permitted wolf-hunting in 2012 was associated
with an average decrease in individual tolerance for wolves
among male residents of Wisconsin’s wolf range (Hogberg
et al., 2015). Likewise, an unpublished report on Montana
residents’ self-reported recollections of their own attitudes
suggested a wolf-hunt did not change tolerance for wolves,
although it did improve attitudes towards wolf managers
(Lewis et al., 2012). Yet attitudes are mainly relevant to
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trustees to the extent that attitudes shape beneficiaries’
expectations about the balance of use and preservation.
Attitudes may ultimately manifest in a variety of individual
behaviours that can directly and indirectly influence
predators and conservation outcomes. Direct behaviours
may include poaching or protective stewardship among
others. Indirect behaviours may include communications
and contributions for or against policies for predator
conservation. Therefore attitudes to poaching, preservation,
and legal uses are of particular interest.
The mechanisms that facilitate predator-poaching and
the motives behind such behaviour have only recently
been studied. The traditional view that poaching is driven
by retaliation for livelihood losses is inconsistent with
evidence that wealthier individuals are more involved in
and intent on jaguar poaching (Marchini & Macdonald,
2012; see also Browne-Nun˜ez et al., 2015, for wolves).
Therefore, the causes of poaching reflect complex social
patterns beyond simple retaliation for economic losses
caused by predators and other wildlife. Individual fear,
direct financial incentives, pathological behaviour, beliefs
that predator-killing is beneficial for game conservation or
property protection, or identity group norms and values
that attach status or rewards to illegal behaviour, all may
lead an individual with opportunity to poach into that
action (Marchini & Macdonald, 2012; Kahler, Roloff &
Gore, 2013; Sharmaa et al., 2014; Browne-Nun˜ez et al.,
2015). Poaching may be encouraged by scapegoating,
downgrading the value of predators, or beliefs that poaching
is a common or acceptable behaviour unlikely to be
punished (St. John et al., 2012; Chapron & Lopez-Bao,
2014; Treves & Bruskotter, 2014). Poachers also sometimes
justify their crimes by citing deficient knowledge of the rules,
or corruption and other unfairness in systems of wildlife
allocation (Gore, Ratsimbazafy & Lute, 2013). Consistent
with empirical findings in other social psychological studies
of sensitive behaviours, St. John et al. (2012) documented
that respondents inclined to poach predators believed
their behaviour and intentions were in the majority. If
would-be poachers who only have intentions to behave
illegally are encouraged to act by other illegal actions,
then the result could be propagation of predator poaching
through a social network. Social norms are often resistant
to policy interventions because members of identity groups
gain status by defying outgroups, which often include law
enforcement (Kinzig et al., 2013; Lute & Gore, 2014). These
findings suggest that policy interventions designed to increase
acceptance of predators should be evaluated scientifically
and informed by recent social science (Dickman, Marchini &
Manfredo, 2013; Treves & Bruskotter, 2014). If poaching is
caused by this complex interplay of psychological and social
factors, policy interventions that hope to reduce poaching
will need to integrate more sophisticated measurements
using a mix of quantitative and qualitative social scientific
methods (Browne-Nun˜ez et al., 2015). Because illegal uses of
predators are poorly understood, remedies for poaching are
on uncertain ground.
Practitioners and scientists commonly assume that
intolerance for predators leads to retaliation because people
perceive threats to human safety and livelihoods. Therefore,
it is reasoned, reductions in predator populations can
reduce perceived threats associated with the species and
thereby improve acceptance. But hazard-acceptance theory
predicts acceptance of risks such as predators is influenced
by the benefits as well as the costs of the hazard; both
cross-sectional and experimental tests support the theory for
predators (Slagle et al., 2013; Bruskotter & Wilson, 2014).
Furthermore, indirect anti-poaching interventions such as
financial incentives may have to reach potential poachers not
just the individuals who express intolerance for predators;
indirect interventions may have to be paired with a direct
anti-poaching interventions in any case (Persson, Rauset
& Chapron, 2015). Yet, the path to better understanding
of poaching will be uphill if the alternative hypothesis
we proposed above finds support. If intolerant interest
groups exert their power by capturing agencies, media,
and constitutive processes, then measuring the attitudes of
the more-readily accessed public may not shed much light
on actions that oppose predator preservation. Successful
and prudent trust asset preservation under these conditions
may demand that trustees be separated from the asset
managers who are exposed tomany pressures from those they
regulate and with whom they interact. Full treatment of the
separation of powers between trustees and trust managers
is beyond our scope but that deep reflection has begun
(Scott, 1999; Horner, 2000; Smith, 2011; Hare & Blossey,
2014). Even if predator managers grapple successfully
with the scientific uncertainties and the political obstacles
to preserving predator populations, independent trustees
may still face genuine conceptual challenges in balancing
alternative uses of predators.
VI. BALANCING COMPETING USES OF
PREDATORS WITH COMPLEX BEHAVIOURAL
ECOLOGY
The public expresses a variety of legally recognized uses
and interests in predators. People observe, feed, track, and
discuss them, in addition to hunting, trapping, and retaliating
for property losses. In principle, the PTD protects all legally
recognized interests against infringement by any of the others.
Therefore depletion of the asset requires scrutiny, following
Illinois Central (1892) in the U.S.A. and other countries’
constitutional provisions (Blumm&Guthrie, 2012; see online
Appendix S1). The nature of any infringement between uses
will necessarily be influenced by the behavioural ecology of
predators and humans.
(1) Lethal and non-lethal customary uses
Because most people are urban residents and that trend
is continuing worldwide, the majority will probably never
use predators by killing them (Treves & Martin, 2011;
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Bruskotter et al., 2013). Even within an urbanizing world,
diffuse uses of predators continue. For example, the
Anishinaabe (Ojibwe) value the gray wolf above other
animals http://www.ojibwe.org/home/about_anish.html
(David, 2009; Shelley et al., 2011). Diverse groups of people
appreciate the wolf aesthetically in art or in wildlife-watching
(Duffield, Neher & Patterson, 2008). For example, the
Swedish Association of Ecotourism Industries complained
in 2013 to the Swedish government that the decision to
eliminate wolf packs in a licensed hunt would jeopardize
the profitability of eco-tourism companies (see also Center
for Biological Diversity, 2013; Collins, 2013). Organized
non-consumptive users may perceive infringement by con-
sumptive users such as predator-hunters although data on
this infringement are sparse at present. Consumptive uses
bear a special burden when one employs public trust think-
ing. Intergenerational equity demands that one prioritize
preservation of the principal of the asset for future genera-
tions. Whether this goal is achieved by legally recognizing
the intrinsic value of environmental assets (i.e. indepen-
dent from current human uses) or by requiring trustees to
advocate explicitly for future generations remains debated.
Regardless, current generations should not decide how future
citizens should preserve or use the assets. Setting aside this
argument about intrinsic value and intergenerational equity,
we turn to the adjudication of conflicts between current uses
of predators.
Similar to how courts may play counter-majoritarian roles
to protect minority interests, the government trustees that
allocate wildlife resources should not be swayed unduly
by the popularity of certain uses. The test for a trustee
adjudicating between uses should rather be whether the
trustee has recognized and successfully balanced the diverse
public interests in predators, especially the diffuse uses (Sax,
1970).
Although hunters are a minority in the U.S., E.U., and
likely most industrialized countries (Pergams & Zaradic,
2008; see also http://www.face.eu/about-us/members/
across-europe/census-of-the-number-of-hunters-in-europe-
september-2010 accessed April 2015), majorities in most
regions support regulated hunting with variable bounds on
its purposes, methods, locations, and sustainability (Reiter
et al., 1999; Treves & Martin, 2011). Nevertheless, neither
the number participating, nor the popularity of a particular
use, should dictate strongly how a trustee allocates wildlife to
beneficiaries. Because future generations inherit the asset in
perpetuity, without substantial impairment, the allocation to
current users that deplete the asset is an incremental addition
to ‘impairment’, which must always be less than ‘substantial’
(Illinois Central, 1892). In the following sections, we explain
why diffuse uses would receive preferential treatment under
the U.S.A. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the PTD (see
online Appendix S1).
Generally public trust thinking would view non-
consumptive uses asmore prudent uses of a trust asset because
they rarely deplete the asset. Certainly some diffuse uses
deplete the asset. For example, tourism can harm wildlife,
although rarely to the point of mortality (e.g. Dunstone
& O’Sullivan, 1996; Treves & Brandon, 2005). On the
other hand, some diffuse uses of wildlife may enhance
the asset by increasing others’ access or enjoyment. For
example, if feeding, creating refuges, restoring habitat, etc.
were measurably enhancing the benefits for other users, the
activity might be seen as highly preferred to taking wildlife
or otherwise depleting the asset. Given the possibility of
harming or depleting wildlife, trustees should look more
cautiously at lethal uses than has been traditional under
North American wildlife management (Section III). Trustees
held to a fiduciary trust standard would likely suspend
lethal uses until uncertainty and scientific controversy about
sustainability are deemed minor (Section IV). However the
PTD recognizes customary uses, which include hunting, so
outright bans on predator-killing seem unlikely. Therefore
balancing lethal and non-lethal uses of predators will remain
important.
Balancing lethal and non-lethal uses is not straightfor-
ward. Advocates often claim a broad public interest in
killing predators. Similar statutory claims exist. For example,
the ESA allows proactive killing of wild animals before
human injury occurs as an exception to prohibitions on
take, when wild animals ‘constitute a demonstrable but non-
immediate threat to human safety’ (http://www.fws.gov/
policy/library/2002/02fr1494.html accessed 31 August
2015 citing 50 CFR1 § 17.31). The ESA also accommodates
predator-killing as a conservation practice, ‘ . . . predator
control, protection of habitat and food supply, or other con-
servation practices . . . ’ (16 USC § 1531 Sec. 4(b)). Indeed
state and federal agencies have long cited the protection of
listed species, as well as health and human safety reasons,
to kill small numbers of listed predators, including entire
wolf packs. However the most frequent and widespread rea-
son governments give to kill predators is to protect wild
game or domestic animals and other property (Doremus,
1999; Treves, 2009). There are three problems with this
justification as a broad public interest.
First, protection of property is a private interest in most
cases. U.S.A. federal courts have repeatedly rejected the
notion that the government is responsible for takings that
result from the actions of wild animals (Thompson, 1997).
Reintroduced wild animals are more often subject to lethal
intervention though (Doremus, 1999). Second, justifying
killing predators to prevent property damage erects a false
dichotomy, ‘ . . . ‘‘Environment or healthy human economics.
You cannot have both.’’ This classic false dichotomy of an
inexorable tradeoff is a powerful and seductive mind-framing
which serves to undercut environmental regulation generally’
(Plater, 2004, p. 303). A recent review of that question
concluded, ‘an increase in stringency of environmental
policies does not harm productivity growth’ (The Economist,
2015). Treves, Wallace & White (2009b) provided evidence
for why there is always more than one intervention to resolve
human–wildlife conflicts, one that addresses the outcomes
of encounters between people and wildlife, and another that
addresses how people perceive such encounters. Thus lethal
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management should be viewed as a candidate intervention,
not the only option. Indeed, physical intervention directed at
wildlife, should always be juxtaposedwith other interventions
that influence human perceptions or behaviour (Treves
et al., 2006). A prudent trustee should be aware of and
weigh alternatives on their merits as well as their effect on
preservation and other legal uses. Third, experts worldwide
agree that non-selective killing of predators typically does
not prevent property losses (Knowlton, Gese & Jaeger, 1999;
Greentree et al., 2000; Bartel & Brunson, 2003; Donnelly &
Woodroffe, 2012; Vial & Donnelly, 2012; Krofel, Cerne &
Jerina, 2011), except for the extreme of local eradication
or extremely high mortality for long periods over large
geographic areas, which is incompatible with public trust
thinking. Even moderately selective killing has a poor record
of preventing predator damages (Knowlton et al., 1999;
Greentree et al., 2000; Peebles et al., 2013; McManus et al.,
2015; Wielgus & Peebles, 2014; Krofel et al., in press). The
allegedly most effective techniques for eliminating confirmed
culprit predators thus far documented include the following:
shooting lions Panthera leo L. over a carcass within 24 h
of a kill (Woodroffe & Frank, 2005) or acoustic mimicry
of coyotes Canis latrans Say, 1823, followed by shooting
those that arrive to investigate the caller (Sacks, Blejwas &
Jaeger, 1999; Mitchell, Jaeger & Barrett, 2004). Neither has
been subjected to experimental comparisons with non-lethal
methods (reviewed in McManus et al., 2015). The shortage
of evidence for the effectiveness of killing predators to
protect property or human safety should induce hesitancy
among trustees to provide for this use. Under a fiduciary
standard, trustees presented with evidence of inefficacy or
counter-productive effects (Wielgus & Peebles, 2014) might
prohibit the practice as a precaution. Finally, killing predators
to protect private property is an unlikely public interest, but
falls under the more general legal issue of ‘takings’ that
often regulates conflicts between public interests and private
title (Section II). If one cannot demonstrate a broad public
interest in killing predators, then predator-killing becomes a
competing, private use without priority.
Adopting public trust thinking sheds a different light on
permit fees and payments for private uses of public assets.
In the U.S.A., those seeking a pragmatic remedy to the sta-
tus quo of preferential treatment of hunters in allocation of
wildlife assets have argued that non-consumptive users should
pay equivalent taxes and fees for bird feeders, binoculars,
tripods, etc. as hunters pay for ammunition, permits, etc. Pub-
lic trust thinking would suggest that taxes and fees are levied
for uses that deplete the asset or infringe on other protected
public interests. Uses that do not deplete or even enhance the
asset should be encouraged not taxed, in this view. Legally
recognized private uses must be balanced with other legal
uses.However, predator behavioural ecology complicates the
search for balance between depleting and non-depleting uses.
(2) Predators as atypical game species
First and foremost, predators occur at lower densities than
virtually all other game species such as white-tailed deer
Odocoileus virginianus Zimmerman 1780, elk Cervus elaphus L.,
and moose Alces americanus Clinton 1882 in North America.
For example, estimates for Algonquin Park and North
Central Minnesota spanned the range of wolf densities
relative to ungulate prey at 97 and 617 ungulates per wolf,
respectively (Fuller et al., 2003). Sparseness by itself argues
against widespread killing of many predators if one wishes to
protect other uses.
Second, sparseness of predators is partly maintained by
territoriality within and among species. Predators defend
territories more aggressively than most animals (Palomares
& Caro, 1989; Wrangham, Gittleman & Chapman, 1993).
For example wolves kill interloping dogs (Olson et al., 2015),
coyotes (Arjo & Pletscher, 1999; Switalski, 2003), and
conspecifics (Smith et al., 2010). Many predators defend
year-round territories to exclude competitors and neigh-
bours from vast areas (Gittleman, 1989). When gregarious
predators defend territories cooperatively, the size of the
cooperating group influences success in territorial defence
(Packer et al., 1988; McComb, Packer & Pusey, 1994).
Therefore human uses that deplete individuals essential to
cooperative defence may lead to the collapse of territorial
defences (Whitman et al., 2004; Brainerd et al., 2008; Borg
et al., 2014). If neighbouring territorial residents take over
vacated territories without permitting new immigrants
to do so, the local density may diminish for some time.
For example, established packs of wolves occasionally
took over neighbouring territories that were vacated after
human-caused depletions (Bradley et al., 2008; Brainerd et al.,
2008). Depleted territories near to protected source popu-
lations refill more quickly than isolated territories (Adams
et al., 2008). As a result of strict defence of territories and
background sparseness, local predator densities may increase
only slightly when populations grow (Fuller et al., 2003;
Cubaynes et al., 2014; Kittle et al., 2015). In sum, for many
predator populations, depleting a group of predators may not
result in rapid replenishment for other users (lethal or not).
Third, and unlike typical game species, deaths of essential
members (e.g. breeders) in cooperative groups of predators
can destabilize social structures for long periods. For
example, many wolf packs that lost a breeding adult
disbanded and others did not reproduce for one or more
years afterwards; rates of disbanding and reproductive failure
increasedwhenboth breeders died (Brainerd et al., 2008; Borg
et al., 2014). Removal of resident African lions often resulted
in infanticide, injuries to lionesses, and long-lasting instability
of prides (Packer et al., 1988;Whitman et al., 2004). Infanticide
has been detected in solitary predators as well. For solitary
species, the effects of infanticide and other social instability on
population dynamics of small or hunted populations remain
uncertain and controversial (Swenson et al., 1997; Logan &
Sweanor, 2001; Packer et al., 2010; Peebles et al., 2013). Social
disruptions and reproductive failure would presumably rise
in frequency as lethal uses intensify.
Fourth, predator behaviour and spatial ecology may also
challenge zoning schemes commonly used by managers to
separate different uses. Long-range movements can make
Biological Reviews (2015) 000–000 © 2015 The Authors. Biological Reviews published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Cambridge Philosophical Society.
18 Adrian Treves and others
hunting zones a drain on adjacent non-hunting zones for
many predators (Woodroffe & Ginsberg, 1998; Loveridge
et al., 2007). Predators may make long-lasting, long-
distance, extra-territorial forays, often followed by returns
to their source ranges. For example, ∼25% of radio-
collared Wisconsin wolves made long-range, extra-territorial
movements lasting 1month or more (Treves et al., 2009a)
and 25% of such movements were detected at least
once out-of-state. Also predator populations experiencing
high levels of human-caused mortality travelled or bred
further from settlements and roads (Mladenoff et al., 2009;
Theuerkauf, 2009; Ordiz, Bischof & Swenson, 2013).
Researchers on foot using telemetry had difficulty seeing
radio-collared wolves or brown bears in areas of human
use or past persecution (Theuerkauf et al., 2003; Karlsson,
Eriksson & Liberg, 2007; Zedrosser et al., 2011). Therefore,
people may not be able to use predators for feeding, viewing,
or stalking, if those predators are fearful of humans.
In sum, uses of predators that deplete the asset have
the potential to reduce the success of later users over
large areas for years. Although the quality and quantity of
predator population depletion by human use is still genuinely
debated, the conclusion that lethal use needs prudent and
precautionary management has been made repeatedly for
many predators (Whitman et al., 2004; Balme et al., 2010;
Artelle et al., 2013). Yet concerns have lately risen that
government agencies are failing to apply the precautionary
principle and prudent interventions (Bruskotter et al., 2013;
Chapron et al., 2013; Vucetich et al., 2013; Artelle et al., 2014).
We end this review with recommendations for prudent
trustees to adopt precautionary management that prioritizes
preservation of predators as trust assets.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
(1) Traditional wildlife conservation in the U.S.A. and
western Europe, and particularly predator conservation, has
been dominated by a constitutive process that favoured
hunting and other forms of lethal management. Those
traditions often led to abdication of governmental trust
duties and eradication of predators over vast areas, contrary
to public trust principles. However recolonization by several
species of predators since the 1970s suggests that stronger
public trust doctrines can prevent renewed cycles of
eradication.
(2) In Section II and Appendix S1, we described the
modern codification and vision of the environmental public
trust. We distinguished and rejected a variant that expressed
preference for narrow, lethal uses of wildlife. Public trust
thinking demands disinterested trustees that take a broad
public interest approach to allocating environmental assets to
current and future generations, while keeping up to date with
evolving legal and societal recognition of new and customary
uses and accounting transparently and scientifically for
the assets and their uses. A logical but idealized form
of the public trust that holds governments to a fiduciary
standard for environmental assets would demand stronger
preservation by non-extractive use predominantly, ‘prudent
man’ standards for allocations, and the strictest accounting
standards involving the best available science. Improving
trustee effectiveness will require equitable partnerships
between trustees and scientists who are as insulated
as possible from political and financial incentives for
undemocratic allocations. Those partnerships must avoid
the political misuse of scientific evidence and eliminate
the current conflicts of interest inherent to agency capture
by narrow interests. Governance reforms that address
constitutive rules are needed in the U.S.A. and beyond
to enforce the broad public interest in the environment.
(3) In Section III, we reviewed variable expressions
of PTDs across jurisdictions and the abdication of trust
duties for many predators in many U.S.A. states. We
examined recent legal decisions that incorporated public
trust principles for wolf preservation. In the U.S.A., we
identified uncertain, legal application of the PTD and power
struggles between the federal and state governments that
together make a fiduciary trust for wildlife unlikely in the
near future.
(4) In Sections IV–VI, we reviewed the essential role
of scientific evidence from multiple disciplines in assisting
a public trustee to account for predators transparently
and quantitatively. We refined the oft-repeated call for
interdisciplinarity in conservation sciences by explaining how
scientific uncertainty often revolves around understanding
and balancing legal and illegal uses by humans. That
balance will require a sophisticated understanding of human
cognition and action, wildlife behavioural ecology, and the
sustainability of human uses that deplete the assets, as well
as multiple criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of policy
interventions.
(5) In Section IV, we reviewed genuine conceptual
uncertainty about the sustainability of human-caused
mortality. In Sections IV and V, we reviewed poaching
research and the consequences of policy interventions
for people’s attitudes to predators and behaviour toward
predators. In Section VI, we reviewed several aspects
of behavioural ecology among sympatric humans and
predators, which can complicate the trustees’ tasks of
balancing competing uses. To avoid tyrannies of the
minorities or majorities who may demand depletion of
unpopular, native wildlife, we recommend that trustees
use the most prudent principles of scientific evaluation,
precaution, and intergenerational equity to balance
competing uses. We explain how lethal uses of predators
need immediate scientific scrutiny to justify their proposed
contribution to the public interest.
(6) We recommend public trust principles be applied
to the appointment of trustees, separation of powers
between trust managers (wildlife agencies) and trustee
decision-makers, and judicial oversight and intervention
when executive or legislative branches abdicate their trust
obligations. Judges should not hesitate to review agency
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decisions if given evidence of mismanagement, unscientific
accounting, or undemocratic decisions. The judiciary should
not hesitate to examine scientific facts, using independent
scientists it selects itself rather than the litigants’ experts.
Deference to agencies risks capture of the judiciary by
narrow interests. Delegates of the government should adhere
to the same legal standards of trust duties as the government.
Universities with enforceable academic freedom will be
essential in the face of political pressures to submerge or
distort scientific findings. Without such reforms, public trust
in science may dwindle and the credibility of scientific
evidence in policy debates and legal proceedings may erode
further. Regardless we expect predator policy will remain
controversial and continue to test public trust in government.
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APPENDIX S1. PTD CASE LAW, WILDLIFE TRUSTS, AND A GLOSSARY OF PTD 
TERMS 
(1) U.S.A. PTD case law 
The U.S.A. Supreme Court (Martin, 1842) clarified that royal grants passed to the states along 
with the powers of government and affirmed that all ‘royalties’ including wildlife, passed to the 
states with independence in 1776,  
"together with all the lands, islands, soils, rivers, harbors, mines, minerals, 
quarries, woods, marshes, waters, lakes, fishings, hawkings, huntings and 
fowlings, and all other royalties, profits, commodities and hereditaments to the 
said several islands, lands and premises belonging and appertaining, with their 
and every of their appurtenances, and all the estate, right, title, interest, benefit 
and advantage, claim and demand of the King, in the said land and premises… 
And in the judgment of the court, the lands under the navigable waters passed to 
the grantee as one of the royalties incident to the powers of government… For 
when the revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves 
sovereign, and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable 
waters and the soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the 
rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general government…” 
(emphasis added, Martin 1842, p. 408–409).  
Even the dissenting judge did not doubt the following principle, “… our whole country has been 
granted, and the grants purport to convey the soil as well as the right of dominion to the 
grantee… All grants of land, whether dry land or covered with water, are for great public 
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purposes, subject to the control of the sovereign power of the country.” (emphasis added, Martin 
1842, p. 426).  
Illinois Central Railroad Company (1892) – hereafter Illinois Central – and two other 
contemporaneous Supreme Court cases affirmed that the public trust doctrine (PTD) obligated 
the state to preserve public assets beyond navigable waters, while clarifying the limits to private 
property, limits to state grants of public resources, and the relationships between public and 
private interests in such lands. Some of the relevant passages follow: 
“The trust devolving upon the state for the public, and which can only be 
discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has an 
interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property... The state can no 
more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like 
navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use 
and control of private parties, except in the instance of parcels mentioned for the 
improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels can be 
disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains... So with 
trusts connected with public property, or property of a special character, like 
lands under navigable waters; they cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction 
and control of the state… The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can 
never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of 
the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of 
the public interest in the lands and waters remaining... [for the grant of land to a 
corporation to construct a railway]… All such lands, waters, materials, and 
privileges belonging to the state were granted to the corporation…” (Illinois 
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Central 1892, p. 453–454, 470) 
The three dissenting justices, Gray, Brown, and Shiras shared the view of state powers,  
“That the ownership of a state in the lands underlying its navigable waters is as 
complete, and its power to make them the subject of conveyance and grant is as 
full, as such ownership and power to grant in the case of the other public lands of 
the state, I have supposed to be well settled.” (Illinois Central 1892, p. 475–476) 
A federal public trust in land was made clear a few years earlier (United States 1890; Knight 
1891). Citing both of the preceding decisions, United States (1989) asserted a federal wildlife 
trust, “… the United States, much like the States… can maintain an action to recover for 
damages to its public lands and the natural resources on them, which in this action would 
encompass the destroyed wildlife.” (emphasis added, United States 1989, p. 1). Nevertheless a 
U.S.A. wildlife trust has a more confusing history following Geer (1896), 
“...the power or control lodged in the State, resulting from the common 
ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for 
the benefit of all people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the 
government, as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as 
distinguished from the public” (Geer 1896, p. 529) 
Geer (1896) later ran afoul of the Commerce Clause because it prohibited interstate commerce in 
wildlife and was overturned by Hughes (1979). Although the latter decision affirmed “… the 
States' interests in conservation and protection of wild animals as legitimate local purposes 
similar to the States' interests in protecting the health and safety of their citizens. …” (Hughes 
1979, p. 337). Hughes (1979) also circumscribed state powers to preserve wildlife in the face of 
federal powers to regulate interstate commerce. Later, a federal court decision invoked the 
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relevant clauses of Geer (1896) and Hughes (1979) by affirming that state and federal 
governments have the power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of wildlife, as follows, 
“It is well settled that wild animals are not the private property of those whose 
land they occupy, but are instead a sort of common property whose control and 
regulation are to be exercised ‘as a trust for the benefit of the people.’ The 
governmental trust responsibility for wildlife is lodged initially in the state… The 
protection of [wildlife] on public lands was upheld as a proper exercise of 
congressional power under the Property Clause in Kleppe 1976 v. New Mexico, 
426 U.S. 529, 96 S. Ct. 2285, 49 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1976)” (emphasis added, Mountain 
States Legal Foundation 1986, Amicus p. 1 and note 3 respectively).  
The word ‘initially’ above raises doubts as to what comes next. Is there a minimum federal 
standard for such trusts as there is for other environmental protection statutes? Certainly a 2011 
presidential directive on transparent and sophisticated measurements adds to the federal standard 
for accounting for trust assets, 
“Our regulatory system must protect public health, welfare, safety, and our 
environment while promoting economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and 
job creation. It must be based on the best available science. It must allow for 
public participation and an open exchange of ideas. It must promote predictability 
and reduce uncertainty. It must identify and use the best, most innovative, and 
least burdensome tools for achieving regulatory ends. It must take into account 
benefits and costs, both quantitative and qualitative. It must ensure that 
regulations are accessible, consistent, written in plain language, and easy to 
understand. It must measure, and seek to improve, the actual results of regulatory 
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requirements.” (emphasis added, Obama, 2011, p. 1) 
Despite the existence of a federal wildlife trust and presidential executive orders demanding 
sophisticated, transparent accounting for environmental regulation, the federal wildlife trust has 
not been tested since Mountain States Legal Foundation (1986). Instead, challenges to federal 
protections for wildlife have invoked a seemingly lower standard of administrative procedures, 
e.g. Defenders of Wildlife (2014) on Wyoming’s wolves, 
“Listing determinations made under the Endangered Species Act are subject to 
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act ([APA] 5 U.S.C. § 706)... 
Under the APA, a court must hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, 
and conclusions that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law… in excess of statutory authority… or without 
observance of procedures required by law…. But the scope of review is narrow... 
An agency’s decision is presumed to be valid, … and a court must not substitute 
its judgment for that of the agency… A court must be satisfied, though, that the 
agency has examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation 
for its action, including a rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.” (Defenders of Wildlife 2014, p. 13–14) 
We are not aware of legal scholarship that has analysed the differences in outcomes if wildlife 
litigation were adjudicated on standards of PTD rather than capricious and arbitrary standards 
described above. Currently U.S.A. wildlife trust litigation plays out in state courts. 
 
(2) Non-federal wildlife trusts 
Most wildlife trust obligations fall under state laws in the U.S.A. “The public trust doctrine 
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remains a matter of state law…the contours of that public trust do not depend upon the 
Constitution. Under accepted principles of federalism, the States retain residual power to 
determine the scope of the public trust...” (PPL Montana 2012, p. 1235). Therefore the mosaic of 
state wildlife trusts provides important insights into the evolution of PTD in the U.S.A. 
 California’s PTD underwent a gradual but notable evolutionary change (Sax, 1980–1981). 
It began to take modern form in 1971 when a private land title was encumbered with an 
easement for the public. First, the court defined the public trust as “traditionally defined in terms 
of navigation, commerce and fisheries. They have been held to include the right to fish, hunt, 
bathe, swim, to use for boating and general recreation purposes the navigable waters of the state, 
and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes” (Marks 
1971, p. 259). But this case expanded the trust significantly with its sweeping environmental 
message: 
 “one of the most important public uses of the tidelands—a use encompassed 
within the tidelands trust—is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, 
so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and 
as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and 
which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area” (emphasis added, 
Marks 1971, p. 259).  
The public interests in fishing, navigation and commerce now included tidelands lacking a 
current utilitarian purpose. National Audubon’ Society (1983) defined the obligations of the 
trustee. The trustees have a duty to manage sustainably and not impair the trust asset, the duty to 
exercise continued supervision over the trust, the affirmative duty to take the public trust into 
account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses 
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whenever feasible (National Audubon Society 1983). The PTD was further expanded to cover 
California’s wildlife in Center for Biological Diversity (2008). The court recognized that the 
State of California has a statutory public trust duty “pertaining to fish and wildlife” (California 
Fish & Game Code § 711.7). The court did not think the source (statutory, common law, or both) 
of the duties imposed by the trust mattered, only that “public agencies must consider the 
protection and preservation of wildlife” (Center for Biological Diversity 2008, p. 1364). This 
case was also important in defining the trustees as the legislature or the state or local agency 
responsible for managing the trust asset. It also defined the beneficiaries as present and future 
generations of the citizens of California. Furthermore the court ruled that members of the public 
have standing to bring an action against the proper state agency or local entity responsible for the 
breach of trust duties.  
 “The state acts both as the trustor and the representative of the beneficiaries, who 
are all of the people of this state, with regard to public trust lands, and a grantee of 
public trust lands, including tidelands and submerged lands, acts as a trustee, with 
the granted tidelands and submerged lands as the corpus of the trust.” (California 
Public Resources Code § 6009.1b)  
Other states have expanded the limits of the PTD in other ways. Louisiana courts have raised the 
standard of behaviour of trustees, by elevating the required standard of conduct for its 
administrative officials to be more in line with what is expected of a trustee in the law. The 
Louisiana courts view the constitutionally enacted PTD as the adoption of a rule of 
reasonableness, designed to ensure that before an agency or official approves a proposed action 
affecting the public trust resources, it must determine that "adverse environmental impacts have 
been minimized or avoided as much as possible consistently with the public welfare" (American 
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Waste and Pollution Control 1993, p. 1266) including a requirement for an environmental cost–
benefit analysis although not necessarily an economic analysis, as well as explicit fact-finding by 
administrative agencies. In so doing they "must act with diligence, fairness and faithfulness to 
protect this particular public interest in the resources." (American Waste and Pollution Control 
1993, p. 1263). In Hawaii, the trust applies to “all water resources without exception or 
distinction,” including “ground water, surface water and all other water” (Water Use Permit 
Applications 2000, p. 133). “The public trust compels the state duly to consider the cumulative 
impact of existing and proposed diversions on trust purposes and to implement reasonable 
measures to mitigate this impact, including the use of alternative sources.”(Water Use Permit 
Applications 2000, p. 143). A recent case in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the public 
trust to the issue of onshore hydraulic fracking in the Marcellus shale formation. The court held 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has an obligation to “conserve and maintain” the trust as 
well as a duty to act with “prudence, loyalty and impartiality” (Robinson Township 2013, p. 913, 
957). The state also has the duty to “refrain from permitting or encouraging the degradation, 
diminution, or depletion of public natural resources, whether such degradation, diminution, or 
depletion would occur through direct state action or indirectly” (Robinson Township 2013, p. 
957).  
 In sum, a piecemeal and mosaic elaboration of the PTD across U.S.A. states has emerged 
over 45 years since Marks (1971) and Borough of Neptune City (1972). Some states articulated 
explicit wildlife trusts (California) with the public as beneficiaries and any organ of government 
as trustees, others demand precautions (Hawaii), prudence (Pennsylvania), or fiduciary standards 
of their trustees (Louisiana). Assessments of the strength of various state PTDs reinforce the 
image of a mosaic and also suggest that very few states allow citizens to challenge trustee 
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allocations. As of 2006, eight U.S.A. state constitutions established a public trust right in the 
environment, but only four states’ supreme courts had defined the nature of that right (Klass, 
2006). Even fewer states granted civilians the right to hold legislatures or executives accountable 
for environmental trust assets. For example, the states of Michigan and Minnesota both passed 
Acts that, “…provide for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent harm to natural resources 
even where the action at issue does not violate a statute or regulation” (Klass, 2006, p. 19). Only 
15 other states had environmental rights statutes and those were, “…much more limited than 
those in Minnesota and Michigan, allowing only for actions against the state [not other entities], 
or only for actions to enforce violations of existing law” (Klass, 2006, p. 19–20).  
 Among wildlife trusts, there is less case law so the mosaic is even less clear. A strong 
example is provided by California’s wildlife trust (see above) and a weak example of a wildlife 
trust is Idaho (Redmond, 2009).  
 Several other countries’ legal instruments refer to wildlife trusts (Blumm & Guthrie, 2012). 
For example, Uganda’s Constitution states,  
“The utilisation of the natural resources of Uganda shall be managed in such a 
way as to meet the development and environmental needs of present and future 
generations of Ugandans; and, in particular, the State shall take all possible 
measures to prevent or minimise damage and destruction to land, air and water 
resources resulting from pollution or other causes…promote the rational use of 
natural resources so as to safeguard and protect the biodiversity of Uganda.” 
(Article XXVII(ii-iii): http://www.ugandaemb.org/Constitution_of_Uganda.pdf, 
accessed 30 January 2015). 
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Other countries’ laws obligate governments to conserve wild animals as, “Conservation is aimed 
at the long-term protection and management of natural resources as an integral part of the 
heritage of the peoples of Europe.” (Birds Directive, 2010, Preamble (7)). European Union case 
law is consonant. For example, “the adoption of conservation measures is a common 
responsibility of all Member States…” (European Court of Justice 2006, C-6/04, see also C-
247/85, C-252/85, C-118/94). Moreover, the European Court of Justice imposed on Member 
States special conservation duties, and withheld exclusive authority over environmental 
conservation, “…special duties of action and abstention … for concerted Community action…As 
this is a field reserved to the powers of the Community, within which Member States may 
henceforth act only as trustees of the common interest…” (emphasis added, European Court of 
Justice 2006, C-804/79 §30 and C-325/85 §15). 
 
(3) Glossary  
Constitutive processes are the rules governing wildlife agency decision-making. 
Diffuse uses of wildlife are inconspicuous, dispersed in space or time, or affecting individual 
wild animals subtly (e.g. wildlife watching, aesthetics, reverence). 
Doctrines are legal tests established in constitutional, statutory, or common law precedents that 
guides formal judgments (as in public trust doctrine or PTD). 
Environmental assets are any component of the natural environment. 
Environmental trusts are relationships created by citizens designating an accountable body 
(trustee) to hold a nation’s environmental asset in perpetuity for the benefit of current and future 
generations of citizens, subject to duties to preserve, account, and allocate those assets.  
p.  
!
11 
Fiduciary trusts contain obligations similar to those of a financial or charitable trust and require 
prudent management to preserve the principal, favouring asset growth over expenditure, to allow 
future generations to choose their own uses as well as continuous, state-of-the-art, transparent 
accounting before allocating assets to beneficiaries. Prioritizing preservation above any use is 
fundamental in public trust thinking because of intergenerational equity. 
Historical democratic vision of the PTD: Judge Joseph Sax (1936–2014) articulated a vision of 
the environmental public trust as an evolving doctrine that was responsive to changing societal 
needs and whose paramount role was to defend society from undemocratic allocations of 
environmental benefits. Sax (1970) urged courts to protect and prioritize the broadest public 
interest in environmental resources, even if diffuse and difficult to measure. 
Intergenerational equity imposes a duty on current generations to preserve assets for future 
generations without restricting the uses of those assets. Current generations cannot impose 
particular uses on future ones because democratic governments enjoy freedom of self-
determination. 
Preserve: the U.S.A. set a minimum standard for wildlife conservation by federal court rulings 
that confirmed the authority and responsibility of states to “preserve”, “protect”, “manage”, 
“conserve”, or “regulate the exploitation” of wild animals to avoid impairment of the public 
interest. We encompass all these state duties generally with the term ‘preserve’, to capture the 
mandate of intergenerational equity. 
Public trustees should be characterized by independence, integrity, expertise with trusts or 
beneficiaries, comprehensive knowledge of uses, and accountability to challenges by 
beneficiaries. The general standard of care holds trustees to “manifest the care, skill, prudence 
and diligence of an ordinary prudent man engaged in similar business affairs”. An ordinary and 
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prudent man is an objective standard, which favours preservation of the trust principal over 
expenditures, so must refrain from maximizing disbursements of benefits in favour of optimizing 
preservation of future benefits. Besides a duty to apply that expertise prudently, a trustee also has 
a duty to solicit sound advice, and keep good records of the assets. (See the U.S. Uniform Code 
of Trusts for further details at http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Trust%20Code, 
accessed September 2014). 
Public trust principles hold governments accountable to conserve environmental components as 
assets held in permanent trust for current and future generations. Permanence implies 
preservation of the assets. Intergenerational equity is fundamental. Transparent and complete 
accounting is fundamental. The trust for the public interest is fundamental.  
Undemocratic allocations are tyrannical by a minority or a majority, or otherwise illegal or 
unjust. 
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APPENDIX S2. ALLOCATING PREDATORS WITHOUT REGARD TO THE PUBLIC 
TRUST 
The State of Wisconsin codified a PTD, as, “The legal title to, and custody and protection of, all 
wild animals within this state is vested in the state for the purposes of regulating the enjoyment, 
use, disposition, and conservation thereof.” (Wisconsin Statutes § 29.11) and affirmed it under 
multiple State court precedents since 1933 (Blumm et al., 2014; Scanlan, 2000). For example, “It 
is well established that the title to all wild animals within its borders is held by the state in its 
capacity as sovereign for the benefit of the people of the state.” (citing State 1933 in State 1962, 
p. 448). Because Wisconsin’s Constitution was amended in 2003 with, “The people have the right 
to fish, hunt, trap, and take game subject only to reasonable restrictions” (Article 1, Section 26), 
we examine the reasonableness of the restrictions on wolf-hunting and policies in light of existing 
game laws and the preceding public trust obligations. Sax (1970) encouraged judiciaries to 
scrutinize allocations of environmental resources for “eagerness”, especially if the government 
allocates the assets without “careful, sophisticated measurements of costs and benefits” (see 
Section II of main text).  
 
(1) Eagerness to allocate assets to narrow interests 
The principal argument against eagerness would be the first official effort to legalize wolf-
hunting dated back to 1999 (Treves, 2008). However, the 2012 delisting of wolves in a population 
estimated at 815 wolves by April 2012 was followed by speed in legalizing wolf-killing and in 
refashioning the constitutive process and in allowing unusual hunting methods. Specifically, on 
28 January 2012, one day after federal delisting, a draft bill to legalize wolf-hunting was released, 
which apparently caught the wolf managers in the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
(WDNR) unaware (Rowen, 2013). The resulting State Act 169 included emergency rule-making 
to sell wolf-hunting permits six months later (Board, 2012). By 2013, the State lowered the 
permit fee (Board, 2013) and denied Native American tribes their share of treaty rights to half of 
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the harvest, ostensibly because the tribe did not wish to kill those wolves (Sanders, 2013; Zorn, 
2012). The State also initially authorized hunting methods that were prohibited for all or virtually 
all other state game species, including road-side shooting, night-hunting, and hound-hunting 
without provisions to avoid fighting between hounds and wildlife (Board, 2012; Wisconsin 
Federated Humane Societies 2013). Quotas began moderately and then escalated. From a late-
winter wolf population estimated at 779 adults outside of tribal reservations in April 2012, private 
hunters and government trappers legally killed approximately 119 adults or 15% of the adult 
population (Board, 2012; Macfarland & Wiedenhoeft, 2013). In 2013, these actors legally killed 
approximately 160 additional adult wolves or 21% of the 775 wolves estimated in April 2013 
(Macfarland & Wiedenhoeft, 2013). The Secretary of the WDNR advocated more rapid reduction 
of the wolf population on the first day of the 2013 wolf-hunt, “We will honor the established 
population goal... If we do reach 350 animals, it may mean that public harvest is extremely 
limited and we are only controlling problem wolves” (Stepp, 2013). Aiming for a 57% reduction 
from 815 to 350 wolves raised concerns for some because there were no scientific studies behind 
the value of 350 wolves (WDNR, 1999). The preceding policies and schedule suggested 
eagerness. 
 
(2) Narrow interests 
While planning the wolf-hunt, the State under-represented diffuse uses when it denied non-
hunters and all university researchers seats at the wolf advisory committee, and invited pro-
hunting organizations to fill half the seats (Durkin, 2013; Rowen, 2013). Although a federal treaty 
with the majority tribe in Wisconsin granted rights to half the quota of any harvestable species in 
the majority of wolf range (David, 2009; Sanders, 2013), only one of 17 seats was granted to a 
tribal representative. Later the tribes’ annual participation in the annual wolf accounting was 
denied in 2014 (Rowen, 2014). Independent observers who spanned the range of political 
viewpoints agreed that narrow interests were being served and broader public interests excluded, 
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by the State’s constitutive process (Durkin, 2013; Lueders, 2013; Rowen, 2013, 2014; Sanders, 
2013). A small minority of hunters – those who used bear-hounds – seemed preferred (Lueders, 
2013; Rowen, 2014). 
 Wolf-hunting was a narrow interest in the U.S.A from 2009–2014. One estimate for 
Wisconsin indicated <20% of residents self-identified as having hunted in 2005 (USDOI & 
USDOC, 2006); 2750 wolf-permits were offered in 2013 (~0.06% of the population), and at the 
highest quota only 275 hunters took wolves legally (Board, 2012, 2013, 2014). Wisconsin is not 
unusual in this regard. In 2013, Idaho’s population estimated at ~1,600,000 contained ~250,000 
licensed hunters, ~44,000 of whom bought permits to shoot or trap wolves (<3% of the state 
population and only 379 permitted hunters took wolves legally 
http://fishandgame.idaho.gov/public/docs/wolves/summary2013.pdf; 
http://wsfrprograms.fws.gov/Subpages/LicenseInfo/HuntingLicCertHistory20042013.pdf).  
 
(3) Reasonable restrictions and careful accounting 
The State of Wisconsin eventually authorized hunting methods (see above) that were prohibited 
for all or virtually all other state game species (Wisconsin Federated Humane Societies 2013). 
For example, Act 169 authorized use of hounds in wolf-hunting, a practice prohibited throughout 
North America and Western Europe, and for which no scientific assessments existed (Hristienko 
& McDonald, 2007; Wisconsin Federated Humane Societies 2013). Litigants stated, “Facing this 
new and unprecedented type of hunting, one may have expected the [WDNR] to be cautious in 
their emergency rules governing the first such hunt. Instead, [the WDNR] decided to impose 
virtually no restrictions on the use of dogs….” (Wisconsin Federated Humane Societies 2013, pp. 
182–183).  
 Accounting for wolves was also called into question on scientific grounds (Treves et al., 
2014). All three quotas of 2012–2014 were set without the state reporting recruitment or breeding 
success or scientific reporting of mortality estimates (Board, 2012, 2013, 2014; Treves et al., 
p. 4 
2014). It is axiomatic in wildlife management that population change is a function of births minus 
deaths and that quotas for small populations must be carefully set to avoid population crashes 
(Fryxell et al., 2010). A team of scientists reanalysed the State’s annual report and identified 
several issues that were inconsistent with standard wildlife management practices and 
conservation science. They also expressed additional concerns about an unspecified population 
model guiding harvest, as well as unregulated take, and changes in monitoring methods and 
reports (Treves et al., 2014). By April 2014, the state had changed its methods of monitoring 
wolves and reporting the status of the wolves. Specifically, the State changed its criteria for 
accepting volunteer wolf-tracker data and then closed the formerly open-door census accounting 
to bar tribal co-management and public scrutiny (see Section 1 above). Wisconsin was not alone 
in reducing the transparency of its accounting for wolves. Several states changed their wolf-
monitoring methods after wolf delisting. In 2014, Montana announced a new way of estimating 
wolf populations (Gude et al., 2012; Kuglin, 2014) and Idaho changed the definition of a 
breeding pair of wolves (Cole, 2014; Idaho Department of Fish and Game and Nez Perce Tribe, 
2013). Neither the State nor the USFWS expressed concern, although the latter admitted 
management had changed significantly since delisting 
(http://faculty.nelson.wisc.edu/treves/reports/Letter%20to%20USFWS/Response_to_Acting_Dire
ctor_Wooley_USFWS.pdf). The USFWS’ own rules for post-delisting monitoring (PDM) seemed 
to oppose such changes,  
“To maximize comparability of future PDM data with data obtained before 
delisting, [states and tribes] have committed to continue their previous wolf 
population monitoring methodology, or will make changes to that methodology 
only if those changes will not reduce the comparability of pre- and post-delisting 
data…In addition to monitoring population numbers and trends, the PDM will 
evaluate post-delisting threats, in particular human-caused mortality, disease, 
and implementation of legal and management commitments. If at any time during 
p. 5 
the monitoring period we detect a significant downward change in the 
populations or an increase in threats to the degree that population viability may 
be threatened, we will evaluate and change (intensify, extend, and/or otherwise 
improve) the monitoring methods, if appropriate, and/or consider relisting the 
WGL DPS, if warranted...” (emphasis added, USFWS, 2006, p. 15266–15305) 
In sum, Sax (1970) had warned the judiciary of governmental eagerness to allocate environmental 
assets to a narrow interest without clear and sophisticated measurements of costs and benefits.  
The State of Wisconsin allocated wolves eagerly to a narrow minority from 2012 to 2014 without 
using the best available science to account for the costs and benefits of allocating a public asset. 
The amount of the asset depleted by lethal users was unknowable due to inadequate accounting 
by the government and an unwillingness by the federal administrative agency to uphold its own 
rules for monitoring. 
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